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1 INTRODUCTION  
Banks are heavily leveraged. In Finland the overall bank capital to assets ratio has de-
clined from 10. 3 % (2003) to 4.4% (2012) in just under ten years (World Bank data). 
Equity worked as it is supposed to; as a safety cushion to absorb the losses incurred from 
the financial crisis of 2007. As the European economy is finally ascending up from the 
deep decline the crisis caused, the banks should now raise their equity ratios once again 
to be prepared for forthcoming crisis. In Finland the commercial banking industry is 
highly interconnected and consolidated on a few large banks, Nordea Suomi Oyj, Osuus-
pankki, Danske Bank Oyj and S-Pankki Oy. Concentration is characteristic to Scandina-
vian banking culture. However, it brings along risks that arise from the interconnected-
ness of the banks. If one of these few banks went under, it would cause the remaining 
banks huge losses, as they would now lose their investments and loans to the failing bank. 
This is one of the reasons why the capital structure of these banks should be under closer 
investigation. If these banks were highly leveraged and would face a negative shock and 
go under, the whole banking system in Finland would be endangered. 
Bankers have argued that as the equity ratio, that is the ratio between a bank's equity 
and total assets, of a bank increases so will the bank’s funding costs and that the higher 
funding costs will therefore be shifted to the public by tightening lending operations. For 
example Josef Ackermann, the CEO of Deutsche Bank has said that “More equity might 
increase the stability of banks. At the same time however, it would restrict their ability to 
provide loans to the rest of the economy. This reduces growth and has negative effects 
for all.”1 (November 20, 2009, interview.) They base their argument simply on the fact 
that equity holders require a higher return than debt holders and therefore equity is more 
expensive. However, as will be shown in section two, Modigliani & Miller -theorem 
proves that this is not the case in corporate finance. The Modigliani and Miller theorem 
states that the funding construction of a corporate is irrelevant to their funding costs since 
more equity decreases the premium that the investors require for their money.  
Based on Modigliani and Miller theory, Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2012) esti-
mate how the doubling of banks’ equity ratio impacts the total funding costs for banks 
operating in Great Britain. They find that the funding costs will not increase linearly when 
raising the equity ratio. This study will lean on their findings and show how raising the 
equity ratio affects Finnish banks’ funding costs. In Finland this issue has not yet been 
                                                 
1 The argument is quoted to reflect the general view of many on the debate of capital regulations 
and may not reflect the current opinion of the cited. 
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studied. Therefore it is interesting and relevant to apply the Modigliani and Miller theo-
rem and recent studies to the situation in Finland. The extra relevance comes from the 
calculations in chapter 5 where the costs of doubling two of Finnish commercial banks’ 
equity ratios is computed. However, the primary emphasis in this study is to concentrate 
on the previous literature and research on the subject of the cost of equity. The alleged 
high cost of equity is the main reason why bank leverage is at a high level. These kind of 
assumptions expose the whole banking system to financial crisis and can be the cause of 
an economic downturn.  
It also matters whether the costs of equity and debt financing are borne by banks or 
the public. For instance, even if high bank leverage ratios may seem to lower banks’ pri-
vate costs, the growing risk of bank failure is borne by the public and therefore increases 
the social cost of bank funding. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) have 
shown that the social benefits that arise from significantly higher equity requirements are 
large, while the social costs are almost non-existent. 
Overall this thesis concentrates on the previous literature and articles of defining 
whether the benefits of raising equity ratios overcomes the increase in funding costs and 
whether the actual rise in funding costs even exists. However it is interesting to see that 
if Finnish banks doubled their equity ratios, their funding costs would not rise in the same 
pace. Actually the rise in funding costs is somewhat small compared to the benefits that 
arise from stable banks. These results are similar to the studies conducted in the UK and 
Norway. Therefore it can be concluded that if Basel III2 would require for instance an 
equity ratio of 20 percent or capital ratio of 30 percent3, it would not affect the Finnish 
economy tremendously by tighter loan supply of banks or as much higher service charges 
for the banks’ customers. In this study the results actually show that if Finnish banks were 
to double their equity ratios, their funding costs would only increase by 23—163 basis 
points. When interpreting these figures, it must be kept in mind, that Nordea and Danske 
Bank already have an equity – and capital ratios of 14% to 20%.  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether a rise in the equity ratio causes higher 
funding costs for banks and is the relationship between these two linear as has been the 
common belief. Does the doubling of Finnish banks’ equity ratios also increase their 
funding costs in the same pace? This study also examines the modern day banking regu-
lations and their complexity. It is controversial whether the raising of the equity ratio to 
                                                 
2 Basel requirements are the frames that control banks’ financial structure and risk measuring.   
3 The difference between equity and capital ratio in this context is thought as that equity ratio is 
equity over all assets as capital ratio is equity over risk-weighted-assets.  
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some predefined percentage would solve some of the stability problems that are now con-
trolled by heavy regulation. The heavy regulation has also triggered the banks to create 
their own ways of measuring risk and this leads to a situation where risk-weighting can 
be biased. In a situation like this, the accurate financial structure of a bank is not easy to 
estimate. This study discusses about the issue of risk-weighting and its reliability.  This 
study examines the reasons behind the heavy Basel regulation. One research goals it to 
analyze whether Danske Bank and Nordea meet the given requirements. As the banking 
system is now moving towards the Basel III requirement, all the new regulation requires 
monitoring and that of course incurs costs. Basel requirements are the frames that control 
banks’ financial structure and risk measuring. The European Central Bank has estimated 
that in 2015 their expenditure for banking supervision is going to be around 260 million 
euros per year (European Central Bank, press release 2014). This can be seen a great cost 
just to monitor that everyone follows the rules and the complex system that Basel agree-
ments have created. To calculate the accurate costs of regulation is rather challenging. 
However, there has been some estimations on the matter and this thesis assesses them 
more closely in chapter 3. However there are reasons behind the regulation of bank equity. 
Banks, on their own initiative, do no hold enough equity to avoid insolvency. The gov-
ernments grant banks deposit insurance which reflects on the banks’ interest of deposits 
by lowering them under their accurate market rate. This happens because the deposit in-
surance decreases the risk of scarce capital stock to the banks’ shareholders. Nevertheless, 
banking crisis induce costs to the economy and in long term to avoid the crisis banks need 
to hold more equity than they would do under the deposit insurance subsidy. Despite of 
all the negative externalities such as credit contagion4, banks do not have enough incen-
tives to guard themselves against bankruptcy.  
This thesis is structured as follows; at first, this study will explain why and how capital 
requirements are controlled. Section 2 will provide the reader with an understanding of 
the costs of holding different types of capital. The most important theory to comprehend 
financing costs is Modigliani & Miller -theory, which will be introduced in section 2. It 
will also go over some of the problems over-leverage inflicts and show the reader how 
the governments in many countries subsidize bank indebtedness by granting debt tax de-
ductions. Section 3 is a close examination of the capital adequacy rules described in the 
accord of Basel. It is essential to understand how the banking field is regulated to evaluate 
whether these requirements are enough. At the end of section 3 we will examine the crit-
icism of minimum equity requirements on the cyclical changes point of view. Section 4 
                                                 
4 Credit contagion is a situation when the money market freezes because banks stop interbank 
lending because they cannot know whether the borrower is close to insolvency. 
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indicates how well the above mentioned requirements are followed in Finland and do the 
requirements accrue extra costs to Finnish banks. The section follows closely Miles, Yang 
and Marcheggiano’s article Optimal bank capital (2012). Miles et al. examined how the 
doubling of a bank’s equity ratio affects their capital costs. They noticed that the costs do 
not increase linearly with the raised equity ratio and concluded that even the private costs 
of raising equity levels are almost non-existent for banks. Furthermore the social costs to 
the public decreased as the equity levels were raised. To study the same question with 
Finnish banks, I have chosen to examine Nordea Group and Danske Bank Group. This 
stems from the fact that they were the only Finnish commercial banks that are publicly 
listed and to closely follow Miles et al., the acquired data needs to include stock prices. 
However, the Finnish subsidiaries of Nordea Group and Danske Bank Group are not listed 
in the stock market as a regular share. Danske Bank Oyj is fully owned by Danske Bank 
Group and therefore its shares are not a unit of trading. Nordea Pankki Suomi Oyj has 
only its depositary receipts exchanged in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. For these reasons 
the figures used in this study are those of Nordea Group and Danske Bank Group, using 
data on stock returns in 2000—2013 from Thompson Reuters Datastream. These Nordea 
and Danske Bank specific findings will be discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the 
study and presents the key findings.  
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2 THE COST OF HOLDING EQUITY 
The equity premium is believed to be more expensive than the interest rate of a loan. As 
the borrower can also deduct the interest payments from one’s taxes, with tax concessions 
like this the mainstream belief does not seem to be far-fetched. However, the aim in this 
chapter is to show that the capital structure of a bank is insignificant when one compares 
the capital costs altogether. 
First, this chapter explains why banks need equity capital and how it is connected to 
the bank’s balance sheet. Next it focuses on the theory of investment introduced by Franco 
Modigliani and Merton H. Miller in 1958. Their two key findings state that the capital 
structure of a firm is irrelevant when calculating the average cost of capital. However, the 
question is whether this conclusion only stands for regular companies. The field of bank-
ing is skewed because of the government grant subsidies. This may in fact affect the Mo-
digliani and Miller theory. On the other hand, the results calculated in chapter 5 using the 
figures of two different banks, show similar outcomes as the Modigliani and Miller the-
ory. 
Second, this chapter discusses some of the main problems that originate from exces-
sive leverage. Myers (1977) shows a connection between over leveraged companies and 
underinvestment. Myers illustrates that when over leveraged, a company is willing to pass 
profitable investment opportunities. In the present state of the economy in Europe, this 
point may partly explain why it has been so difficult to get back on the economic growth 
trend after the financial crisis.  
Section 2.4 concentrates on the tax deductibility of loan interest. This chapter will end 
with the analysis of credit crunch which can be thought as a cost of holding too little 
equity. Credit crunch is a situation when the loan supply of banks falls due to a negative 
economic shock and their lack of holding enough equity. This subject will be extended to 
credit contagion. The section will end to the analysis of Mervi Toivanen (2015) who has 
calculated how the concentration of the Finnish banking system reacts to a situation where 
a Finnish or a foreign bank goes bankrupt.  
Debt guarantee5 creates a safety net for banks that affects the price of deposits. When 
a company has irregular income and has only a little equity, the company’s loans are 
thought as risky. It is the same thing with banks, except the company loan is now thought 
as a deposit. Without the debt guarantee this risk would affect the interest of deposits. For 
example; bank A has an equity rate of 30% and bank B has an equity rate of 3%. If there 
                                                 
5 In Finland the government grants a guarantee to the depositors of banks. If the bank would 
become insolvent, the government would secure the customer’s deposits until 100 000euros.   
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is no debt guarantee, the depositors would not be eager to loan bank B in the same rate as 
to bank A. They would demand a risk premium from bank B. This is consistent with the 
Modigliani and Miller theorem. However, when the deposits are guaranteed by the gov-
ernment, both of the banks will get deposits with the same interest, no matter how their 
capital structure looks like. This leads to a situation where the banks’ finance as much as 
they can by deposits and their equity rate stays low. But this does not mean that an as-
sumption should be made that this is the best way to finance for the society. The deposits 
are cheap because of the actions of the government. Nevertheless, for the society it is not 
wise to support the risky finance structure when there is always insolvent banks going 
belly up and the society needs to repair the damage to the depositors by compensating the 
guaranteed deposits. This study will return to the matter of debt guarantee in section 4.4. 
The other issue concerning the banks’ government safety net is that it tempts the banks 
to take on more risky investments. Because of the deposit guarantee, the depositors are 
willing to keep their deposits in the bank regardless of where the banks’ reinvest their 
capital. If the risk-taking succeeds, the bank will gain big profits. If the gamble fails, the 
bank goes belly up and the government will compensate the deposits. To prevent the neg-
ative incentive, the society has to regulate the solidity of the banks.  
2.1 From where do the capital requirements for banks arise? 
Commercial banks accept deposits, provide loans for individuals and businesses and offer 
basic investment products for their customers. In Finland a commercial bank is defined 
as a joint-stock deposit bank (The law of commercial banks, Finlex). The deposit bank -
category also includes savings banks and cooperative banks. In Finland all deposit banks 
are part of the deposit insurance fund. This entitles the deposited funds of an individual 
or a corporation to be insured until 100 000 euros (Deposit Insurance, Finanssivalvonta).  
Equity provides protection against disadvantageous situations. Regulators try to ensure 
that a bank has enough capital to cover risks. Equity is categorized as Tier1 capital. (Hull 
2012, 26) Equity acts as a protective layer of capital that is easily converted into needed 
funds and therefore it is categorized as Tier 1 capital. Central bank regulators require 
banks to hold capital for the risks they are bearing. In 1988, international standards were 
developed for the determination of this capital, as the Basel I was created. Capital is now 
required for each of three types of risk: credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. 
Credit risk arises from the risk that loans and derivatives might default. A bank could lose 
a lot of money when a corporate it has lent to defaults. This has traditionally been the 
greatest risk facing a bank and is usually the one for which the most regulatory capital is 
13 
 
required. Market risk is formed when a bank’s assets decrease in value. Operational risk 
is the risk that the bank cannot manage its operations as usual. That is to say internal or 
external systems fail to work normally and this will generate losses to the bank. (Hull 
2012, 37). 
During the last 15 years Finnish commercial banks’ balance sheets have grown re-
markably. As a result the amount of liabilities of banks has also risen. Below, Figure 1 
illustrates the ballooning of banks’ liabilities during the last 15 years.  
 
Figure 1 Finland’s financial institutions’ balance sheet liabilities (Finans-
sivalvonta)  
As the size of the balance sheet has grown, the wide range of financial instruments it 
withholds has also diversified. This leads to a problem of measuring the risk of the liabil-
ities. When a negative shock hits the economy, bank’s accounts receivable is usually the 
first instalment to be affected. Since the economy is in down turn, banks’ borrowers might 
run into financial difficulties that may prevent them from paying back their loans. This 
causes credit losses. To absorb these losses the bank has to use its equity.  
The difference between the whole value of a bank’s balance sheet and the value of its 
risk weighted assets can be remarkable. Even though Finnish banks’ total regulatory cap-
ital to risk weighted assets ratio has been around 15-16% during 2012 and 2013 (Financial 
Soundness Indicators Finland, IMF), Finnish banks’ capital to assets ratio, 4,9% in 2012–
2013, has been one of the lowest in comparison with other OECD countries. Figure 2 













Figure 2 Capital to assets ratios of OECD countries 2012-2013 (Financial 
Soundness Indicators, IMF)  
It seems justified to regulate the minimum amount of capital according to how risky 
its claims are. However, it is difficult to interpret correctly all the risks a modern bank’s 
balance sheet holds. To tie bank’s capital to its risk weighted assets seems reasonable but 
it withholds risks since the risk weighting of assets can overlook global risks and is vul-
nerable to the banks’ own risk measuring. All this uncertainty in the banking field urges 
banks to prepare themselves against losses with accumulating equity, which is to pay for 
the potential losses. However, the consensus in the field seems to be that when taking the 
equity premium into account, the costs of holding equity overshadows the benefits of 
being able to cover potential losses.  
 
2.2 Modigliani and Miller theory 
When examining how the capital structure of a bank affects its cost of capital, the Modi-
gliani and Miller theory of investment (1958) must be considered. Modigliani and Miller 
theory studies whether there is an optimal financial structure for a firm. Financial struc-
ture is simplified as being the relation between equity and debt. Modigliani and Miller 
distinguish the difference between the special cases of certainty and uncertainty. In case 
of certainty, profit maximization and market value maximization seem to have equivalent 
implications. But as uncertainty was taken into consideration this equivalence vanished. 
The profit outcome, in the case of uncertainty, can be seen as a random variable. This 
means that the use of debt financing rather than equity to finance a project may increase 


































































































































































outcomes. Under uncertainty each decision of a firm is not going to be a unique profit 
outcome but a wide variety of mutually exclusive outcomes. The profit outcome can now 
be thought as a random variable. Modigliani and Miller raise one important question: 
“Will the project, as financed, raise the market value of the firm’s shares?” (Modigliani 
& Miller 1958, 263—264.)  
Before stating their primary conclusions it is important to acknowledge the assump-
tions behind their findings. Modigliani and Miller theory assumes that (Modigliani & 
Miller 1958, 264—266) 
- The mean value of the profit stream over time is finite and represents a random 
variable dependent on a probability distribution. 
- Firms can be divided into homogenous groups by categorizing their equivalent 
returns into the same class. This assumption is relaxed when debt financing is 
considered.  
- Firms and investors operate in the same competitive markets and they both are 
price takers. 
- Prices are equal to the firms and investors. 
- There is perfect information. 
With these assumptions, Modigliani and Miller discover that there must be an equality 
between the market value of the firm and the market values of the firm’s common shares 
and debt. The market value of a firm, denoted with 𝑉𝑗, is equal to the market value of the 
firm’s common shares, 𝑆𝑗, and the market value of the debt of the firm, 𝐷𝑗 . ?̅?𝑗 denotes the 
expected return on the assets owned by the firm and 𝜌𝑘is a constant that can be given 
many economic interpretations. 𝜌𝑘 is the expected rate of return of any share in class k. It 
can also be regarded as market rate of capitalization for the expected value of the uncer-
tain streams of the kind generated by the kth class of firms. Modigliani and Miller prop-
osition I states that 
 
𝑉𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗 + 𝐷𝑗 = ?̅?𝑗/𝜌𝑘  for any firm j in class k. (1) 
 
Equations (1) shows that the firm’s market value is independent of its capital structure. 
It also shows that the firm’s market value is given by capitalizing the expected rate of 
return at the rate of 𝜌𝑘 which is particular to the firm’s class. To alter this proposition into 
a form addressing capital costs, it can be stated that the average cost of capital, ?̅?𝑗/𝑉𝑗6, to 
any firm is independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a 
pure equity stream of its class. In the form of an equation, it can be stated that 
                                                 









= 𝜌𝑘   for any firm j in class k.  (2) 
 
If these equalities do not hold for any given pair of firms in a class, arbitrage7 will take 
place until the equalities are restored. If proposition 1 does not hold, an investor could 
buy and sell shares and bonds in a way where he would just exchange one income stream 
to another. The income streams would be identical in all relevant aspects but the investor 
would sell in a lower price. When investors would exploit these arbitrage opportunities, 
the price of an overpriced share would fall and the price of an underpriced share would 
rise. This eliminates the difference between the firms’ market values. (Modigliani & Mil-
ler 1958, 266—269.) From proposition I Modigliani and Miller derive their proposition 
II. For companies whose capital structure includes some debt, the expected rate of return, 
i8, is a linear function of the leverage as follows: 
 
𝑖𝑗 = 𝜌𝑘 + (𝜌𝑘 − 𝑟)𝐷𝑗/𝑆𝑗     (3) 
 
In other words, the expected rate of return of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to financial 
risk equal to the leverage ratio9 times the spread between the capitalization rate and debt’s 
interest rate, r. From this it can be seen that as the leverage of a company rises, so does 
the cost of holding equity. Figure 3 illustrates how the increase of leverage affects a firm’s 
expected return on equity. The return on equity10, ROE, rises linearly as the leverage ratio 
rises. This is due to the rising risk level which follows from the growing amount of debt. 
Naturally the owners of the firm want to be compensated for tolerating more risk.  
. 
                                                 
7 In an arbitrage situation one can make profit without a risk.  
8 On the stock of any company j belonging to the kth class. 
9 Leverage meaning the debt-to-equity ratio 
10 Shareholders of a company’s stock require a compensation of their investment in the company. 




Figure 3  The effect of increased equity on ROE (Admati, DeMarzo, Hell-
wig & Pfleiderer 2010, 11) 
The Modigliani and Miller theory concludes that the change towards a higher equity 
ratio is a way to reallocate the risks between creditors and shareholders and therefore the 
capital costs altogether do not change. As the firm’s risks decrease due to the raised equity 
ratio so falls the required return on equity. (Admati et al. 2011, 13.) Simply the Modigliani 
and Miller theory is about dividing a cake; how the profits, costs and risks are divided 
between the firm’s owners and creditors. Return on equity may not be the best way to 
measure the profitability of equity. As figure 3 shows, a smaller equity ratio steepens the 
slope of the line which can be seen in two ways. For a given capital structure ROE does 
really reflect the realized profitability of the bank’s assets. However, to compare the un-
derlying profitability of two banks, ROE cannot be used when the two banks that have a 
different capital structure. Secondly, higher capital requirements will tend to lower the 
bank’s ROE only in times when ROE is high. They will raise the ROE in bad times when 
ROE is low. This can be seen from ex-ante perspective that the high ROE in good times 
that is induced by high leverage comes at the cost of having a really low ROE in bad 
times. (Admati et al. 2011, 11.)  
Modigliani and Miller summarize that a firm cannot reduce their cost of capital by 
selling bonds even though debt financing seems to be cheaper. They give an example by 
comparing the division of whole milk into butter fat and skimmed milk. Their proposition 
I simply says, that under perfect markets, the dairy farmer cannot earn more by skimming 
the whole milk and selling the butter fat with a higher price even though the price of butter 
fat is higher than the price of the whole milk. The gain that originates from selling higher-
priced butter fat would be lost in the sale of the low-priced residue of thinned milk. Also 
proposition II is compared to the skimming of the milk. Modigliani and Miller say that as 
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the price per dollar of levered stream falls as debt-to-equity ratio increases, it can be com-
pared to the fact that the price per gallon of thinned milk falls continuously as more butter 
fat is skimmed off. (Modigliani & Miller 1958, 279—280.) This linearity, on the other 
hand, can be controversial when the different aspects of banks are taken into considera-
tion. Theorem II states that the cost of equity increases linearly as the leverage of the 
company rises. The more debt a company holds in comparison to equity, the higher is the 
required return on equity since investors will require a higher yield for their now riskier 
investment. However, the deposit guarantee and governments’ willingness to save banks 
that are too-big-to-fail have an effect to the linearity between equity costs and leverage. 
Section 4.4 will return to explain the problem of whether Modigliani and Miller theory 
works for banks. 11 
2.3 Over-leverage and underinvestment 
Steward Myers (1977) contemplates why firms with the advantage of tax-deductibility 
are not financing all their operations with debt. Myers suggests that highly leveraged 
firms will, in some states of nature, dismiss valuable investment opportunities that would 
increase the firm’s market value if executed. (Myers 1977, 148-149).  
The main problem with over-leverage is that it can cause underinvestment. Investing 
would be optimal for the society as to when the net present value of the investment is 
greater than zero. However, the owners of the company could still dismiss the investment 
opportunity if the future profits of the investment would be shifted to the creditors instead 
of themselves. 
This is a common problem in banking crisis. As banks hold a lot of debt, financing a 
new investment whose net present value is greater than zero, can be unprofitable to the 
bank’s owners and therefore they will discard the new investment. If the bank held less 
debt, the owners would benefit more from the new investment and it would be realized. 
This was the case in the financial crisis in Greece. The Greek banks had enormous amount 
of hidden bad debt in their balance sheet that their true solidity was actually negative. 
                                                 
11 Modigliani and Miller theory establish that with prevailing conditions, such as perfect infor-
mation, the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant. Later studies such as Myers 1977, Jensen & 
Meckling 1976, Townsend 1979, Myers & Majluf 1984, have shown that with asymmetric infor-
mation, the capital structure is relevant. Some of these theories favor equity but most of them 
support debt financing.  
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This means over-leverage. During the crisis, Greek banks could have admitted new prof-
itable loans, however, their shareholders were reluctant to invest new capital. That was 
because their newly invested capital would have capitalized the banks to be solvent again 
and therefore most of the new equity would have been used to pay off older debt. (Admati 
et al. 2014, The leveraged ratchet effect, 2). 
Another important concern about over-leverage and underinvestment, raised by My-
erson (2014), relates to Basel III and risk weighting. Basel III favors certain marketable 
securities over loans to individuals and small businesses (Myerson 2014, 207). If the mar-
ketable traded security is well-rated, it will have lower risk weights than individual loans, 
which are not as liquid as securities traded in financial markets. In other words, Basel 
III’s way of using risk weights, creates an incentive for the banks to shift away from 
lending to individuals and small businesses during financial difficulties when their equity 
buffers become scarce, and this leads to an increase in unemployment thereafter. To move 
these loan assets into a lower risk category might have been the motivation for the markets 
to bundle and repackage small loans into marketable securities (Myerson 2014, 207). The 
securitization of small loans into bundles and selling them to investors who were not able 
to understand the whole risk of these securities was one of the main reasons that started 
the financial crisis in US. 
As banks are big agents in the borrowing and lending field and in that way they create 
dependency to each other, it is necessary that they are able to trust in each other’s capital 
adequacy. Non-transparency was one of the issues in the 21st century’s credit crunch. 
Later on, in section 3.4, the term credit crunch is explained and discussed in detail. 
2.4 Tax deductibility 
Tax deductibility distorts bank’s incentives to finance their operations with equity. In 
Finland, as in many other countries, public policy has created an incentive for corporates 
to use debt financing rather than equity because the corporates can deduct their interest 
payments from their taxes. Most arguments against equity financing base their idea on 
the subsidized debt financing. As Admati et al. (2010) prove, this argument does not take 
into consideration the social costs that the debt subsidy incurs on the public. Yes, tax 
deductibility penalizes equity financing but the costs of equity financing in this case are 
only focused on the private costs to the banks and do not take into account the social costs 
borne by the public if high leverage causes a bank to go under. 
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The type of the financing is insignificant to the overall financial costs when taxes are 
not taken into consideration. When liabilities’ interest payments are allowed to be de-
ducted from the company’s taxes, equity financing, on the other hand, is treated differ-
ently. The company is not allowed to deduct the costs of equity from taxes. These costs 
are for instance the dividends the company distribute to the shareholders and capital gains 
to the company. In Finland there has been an ongoing debate on the double taxation of 
the public company dividends.  
Tax deductibility creates an illusion of lowering capital costs when actually it is only 
the case of distribution of public money. When banks choose to finance their operations 
by debt because they are allowed to deduct the debt’s interest payments from their taxes, 
they are also therefore reducing the tax revenue to the government. This can lead to re-
ductions in spending on public goods or to raise taxes somewhere else (Admati et al. 
2011, 20). This means just shifting financing costs from banks to the general public. 
It is contradictory to encourage banks to finance their business with debt by granting 
them tax deductions and at the same time use enormous amount of regulations to attract 
them to use equity financing instead. Panier, Pérez-González, and Villanueva (2012) have 
researched what happens if a government drastically changes when corporations are al-
lowed to deduct interest payments from taxes. The notional interest deduction was intro-
duced in Belgium in 2006. In the research they find that if the tax policy encourages firms 
to use more equity this will evidently lead to more capitalized firms. In Belgium, the 
implementation of notional interest deduction has allowed firms to deduct from their tax-
able income a notional charge equal to the product of the book value of equity times a 
benchmark interest rate based on historical long-term government bonds (Panier et al. 
2012, 1) 
This means that the firms are granted a significant tax deduction despite of their source 
of financing. In the study Panier et al. find a considerable increase in the equity ratios of 
the exanimated companies within only two years’ time horizon. The study also points out 
that similar experiments have been established in Australia, Italy and Brazil for instance, 
but they were only for a short period of time and the results are mixed. The other experi-
ments also had stricter conditions and did not cover all firms operating in the represented 
country. (Panier et al. 2012, 8.) Their results show that large Belgian firms raised their 
equity ratios relative to comparison neighboring countries after the implementation of 
notional interest deduction in 2006. Equity ratios increased by 1. 8 to 3. 5 percentage 
points (Panier et al. 2012, 21).  
The findings of Panier et al. (2012, 3) are significant since they also studied the sub-
sidiaries of multinational firms and found that it does not affect the results. They also 
discover that the field of business is insignificant. Their data also comprehended a sample 
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of 1 988 723 firm-year observations from 314 228 unique firms (Panier et al. 2012, 15). 
As the field of study in banking taxation is narrow especially with extensive data, the 
results cannot be generalized into Finnish banking field. However, the results are sugges-
tive of what might happen if the tax deductibility of debt is changed to cover equity fi-
nancing in Finland. Nevertheless, more studies and research on this area of taxing and 
banking must take place before extrapolating it to Finland.  
It is important to note that the most tax deductible way to finance a company is not 
always the best or even the cheapest way to finance a company when looking at the big 
picture. In Finland the principle of neutrality is taking a bigger role in tax legislation. In 
Finland the aim in taxation is that the tax payers’ behavior should not be distorted in any 
direction by the tax laws. (Tikka 1995, 3). What should also be taken into consideration 
is that, as the distribution of dividends is decided on the company level, whereas the lia-
bilities and their interest payments should be paid as the scheme of payment agreement 
beholds. That is why it is rather unnerving to be directed into using debt financing as it is 
inflexible to the economic environment.  
 
2.5 Capital Crunch is caused by the lack of bank equity 
The study of credit and capital crunches was trendy in the 1990’s. That is when the world 
was just recovering from the 1990 recession. Now again, when the world it still living in 
the aftermaths of the financial crisis of 2010, capital and credit crunches are yet again a 
popular topic. Richard F. Syron (1991) was one of the first to make a distinction between 
a credit crunch and a capital crunch. A credit crunch follows the business cycles and it 
can be solved by lowering the interest rates, whereas a capital crunch cannot be as easily 
solved because it origins from a different background.  As credit crunch is mainly caused 
by the lack of bank deposits, a capital crunch results from the lack of bank capital (Syron 
1991, 4). They both cause a serious drop in lending and can freeze the whole financial 
markets. In the recent financial crisis the capital crunch froze the whole interbank lending 
markets. Banks lend to each other in short-term maturity bases. As the banks did not know 
whether the borrowing bank was solvent enough to pay back the loan, it was more secure 
not to lend any capital. This caused a snowball effect when the short-term maturity lent 
loans fell due and banks were reluctant to continue lending to each other. Even the banks 
that were solvent to begin with could no longer borrow from the interbank markets and 
were therefore unable to meet their expiring liabilities. This problem originated from the 
lack of bank equity. In a state of economy where bank equity measures are higher and 
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equity to all capital levels are throughout the bank markets permanently at higher level, 
it could be tested whether this kind of stagnation in the interbank markets would exist. 
However, this is more likely in a world where the banks keep equity levels high in all 
world states, that is also during recession. If capital requirements are held back and loos-
ened during economic down turns, the stagnated situation could still occur and escalate 
quickly.  
Peek and Rosengren (1995) studied the capital crunch of New England in the early 
1990’s. They found that a negative shock on capital is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to cause a capital crunch. They noticed that regulations and regulators have a 
deep impact on how large the effect of the negative shock is on banks. If the amount of 
capital stays well above the minimum required or if the regulators do not enforce the 
capital requirements, the banks will shrink by less. (Peek & Rosengren 1995, 630) 
During the reference period of 1990-1991 large commercial bank equity fell by $33 
million and at the same time the assets dropped by $4.5 billion12 (Peek and Rosengren 
1995, 631). They assess that the large drop in assets was due to the low capital ratios that 
reacted to the collapse of real estate prices. 62 percent of the commercial banks in New 
England that were included in their study contracted during 1990-1991. Peek and Rosen-
gren (1995, 632—633) create the capital crunch hypothesis that predicts that a negative 
capital shock will cause a shrinkage of liabilities and assets to be greater, the lower the 
capital per assets –ratio of the bank is. They find that the deposit growth rates are posi-
tively related to capital per assets –ratios. This would not be the case if the shrinkage 
would only be caused by the reduction in loan demand.  
The difficulty in defining the actual size of the capital crunch is in separating the de-
crease in loan demand that usually occurs during recessions from the reduced supply of 
loans. Peek and Rosengren (1995, 633—634) avoid this problem by focusing on the lia-
bility side of the banks’ balance sheets in their calculations. They studied New England’s 
banks’ behavior during the 1990’s recession by comparing the well-capitalized banks to 
the ones that did not have additional capital and going over their balance sheets during 
the recession. Their model implies that poorly capitalized banks that have a negative 
shock to their capital will shrink their liabilities more than better-capitalized banks that 
are experiencing the same shock. The capital crunch hypothesis finds support in their 
findings. They find that the coefficient on the change in capital is a negative function of 
the capital to assets –ratio. Consequently the coefficient on the change in capital is smaller 
for well-capitalized banks than for poorly-capitalized banks. In the end of their study they 
                                                 
12 In the region of New England, which was the subject of Peek and Rosengren study.  
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emphasize the adverse effects that regulation can have on the economy. (Peek & Rosen-
gren 1995, 635—638) 
Ben Bernanke and Cara Lown (1991, 206) also find that the recession of the early 
1990’s was steepened by the lack of bank equity. However they prefer a more skeptical 
view on the power that the lack of bank equity had on the recession. They find that it was 
the falling credit demand that had the major role in the lending slowdown. Bernanke and 
Lown do not find any evidence that overzealous regulation has reduced lending (1991, 
221). They note that reduced bank lending arising from the lack of bank equity could 
suppress economic activity and this would affect both aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply. This would lead to the reduction of output in short and long run (229).  
To reach a conclusion; it can be seen that there is a connection between the lack of 
bank equity and the origin of a recession. Furthermore, the lack of bank equity effects the 
ability to ascend from the recession. Poorly capitalized banks are hit hard by the drop in 
deposits and at the same time they face strict regulation. Banks that are well-capitalized 
find it easier to adjust on the regime of bank regulation.   
2.6 Credit contagion 
The linkages that banks have on each other was touched upon in the section 2.5. Now this 
section focuses on the core of the credit contagion problem. During the financial crisis of 
2008, the governments and central banks were called to rescue falling banks. The crisis 
showed the importance of links and relationships between banks. The falling bank could 
have repercussions for the other banks even though the banks would not be directly in 
touch. This can be seen from the figure 4. The interbank network is highly concentrated 
on a few large banks that can be seen as the big white dots in the center of the figure. In 
the figure, each node represents a bank in the sample and its size is scaled in the propor-
tion to the sum of interbank exposures of the given bank. Also the darkness of the line 
reflects the proportional value of a bilateral exposure. The figure 4 is a realization of the 





Figure 4 A graph presenting a European interbank network (Toivanen 2015, 
5) 
 
Contagion describes the negative spillover that can spread in an economy or financial 
markets. Therefore it is a crisis that expands from another bank to another. (Toivanen 
Mervi 2015, 1—5).  
Toivanen (2015, 25) finds evidence that the more concentrated the banking system is, 
the more vulnerable it is to contagion. She compares the Finnish crisis of the early 1990s 
and the also the crisis of 2005—2011. In Finland during the 1990’s crisis three banks out 
of ten would have caused a contagion. The contagion would have affected over half of 
the banking system. Without the intervention of authorities, the consequences to the so-
ciety would have been enormous.  
In the crisis of 2005—2011 five big and middle-sized banks were the source of conta-
gion. The contagion of a Finnish bank would have had an effect on 66 percentages of 
Finnish banks’ assets. However, the bankruptcy of a foreign bank would have affected 77 
percentages of Finnish banks assets. (Toivanen 2015, 25). As noted before, the concen-
tration of Finnish banking system is alarming. Even more so when one can see the sensi-
tivity of Finnish banking system to the foreign banks’ bankruptcy. Toivanen also remarks 
that most remarkable sources of contagion are English, French, German and Spanish 
banks. Contagion risk is bigger when the bank has a central position on financial markets 
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and is large on size. On the other hand, banks in Greece, Ireland and Portugal have only 
limited negative effects on the European interbank banking system. (Toivanen 2015, 27). 
Same kind of results is noticed in the research of Paulo Mistrulli (2011), who studied 
the Italian interbank banking system. Mistrulli finds that interconnectedness conduces to 
financial contagion. However, he sees that the severity of the systematic risk of falling 
banks is overestimated in other literature (2011,1125). Mistrulli’s simulation also shows 
that if conglomerates are allowed to recapitalize their affiliated companies, the resilience 
to financial contagion tends to improve. 
Nevertheless, there are important questions that would still need to be answered. Which 
banks in the global markets are the ones that have the biggest risk of infecting other banks 
in the case of insolvency? If these banks can be identified and are then demanded to hold 
more equity, the stability of the whole banking system would improve. 
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3 BASEL AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
The purpose of bank regulation is to ensure that banks hold enough capital to cover their 
risks. In Finland the government insures individuals and corporates by providing them 
deposit insurance. Since a bank is now faced with a moral hazard problem13, by taking 
more risk as the government will cover their losses, it is natural that the government 
agrees to bear the risk only if bank actions are controlled by regulation. 
The fear of systemic risk actuates governments to impose regulations for banks. Sys-
temic risk realizes when a bankruptcy of one large bank causes other banks to fail and 
can paralyze the whole financial system. In situations where a large bank seeks a rescue 
from the government the public authority has to assess whether to bail out the struggling 
bank, and by doing so to signal the market their willingness to be the lender of last resort, 
or to risk the whole financial system by letting the large bank to fail. (Hull 2012, 257-
258) 
To truly understand the cost of the current solvency requirements, it is important to 
understand what these requirements are. The current requirements are based on the as-
sumption that equity is expensive. Therefore higher equity ratio is required only when the 
bank’s lending operations contain risks. If the bank lends to a safe business, required 
equity is low. This principle works as an incentive and protects the banks that need the 
equity buffer the most. In this chapter the research reviews the important factors in Basel 
agreements. To deeply understand where the requirements arise, this chapter begins with 
the older forms of Basel; that is Bank for International Settlements Accord, which is also 
referred as Basel I. The chapter then reviews Basel II and Basel 2.5. The main focus, 
however, remains in Basel III, whose implementation takes place at the moment. This 
chapter also shows how to calculate risk weights on assets. Risk-weighting is a contro-
versial way of measuring assets. It is important to understand how risk-weighting works 
and the complexity of measuring risk. This is one of the key issues in this study. At the 
end of this chapter the study concentrates on the effects that regulation generates over 
economic business cycles. Banking industry is a complex system. To control the industry, 
heavy regulation has been established. However, the heavy regulation creates complexity 
to the banking field that has an impact to the whole economy. 
                                                 
13 The moral hazard problem occurs in situations when a party increases its risk-taking knowing 
that part of the consequence of the risk is borne by others. 
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3.1 Bank for International Settlements Accord 
As banks started operating internationally and began to trade more and more complicated 
instruments, in 1974 Basel Committee was formed to harmonize the rules and require-
ments of the banking industry. The committee’s first agreement was named The 1988 
Bank for International Settlements Accord and it has recently be known as Basel I. Basel 
I defined two requirements bank capital had to satisfy. The first was that the ratio of the 
bank’s assets to its capital had to be less than 20. (Hull 2012, 259) The second demand 
concerned the key regulatory requirement of Cooke ratio. With Cooke ratio the bank’s 
total risk-weighted assets are calculated by observing both the on-balance-sheet and off-
balance-sheet items. Each on-balance-sheet item is assigned a risk weight to reflect its 
credit risk. The off-balance-sheet items are indicated as credit equivalent amount. The 
credit equivalent amount is considered to be a loan capital and to hold the same risk as 
loan capital. The Accord required banks to keep capital equal to at least 8 % of their risk 
weighted assets. The capital was divided into two categories, Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2 
Capital. (Hull 2012, 259-262) The division still holds this day even though the Basel 
committee has updated the content of Tier 1 Capital in Basel III. Tier 1 equity capital 
includes share capital and retained earnings. But it does not include deferred tax assets or 
goodwill. Tier 2 Capital is considered as additional capital and it includes instruments 
such as cumulative perpetual preferred stock, certain types of 99-year debenture issues, 
and subordinated debt with an original life of more than five years (Hull 2012, 262). 
 The 1996 Amendment supplemented Basel I withholding capital to cover market risks 
caused by trading activities. This new way of calculating capital requirements included 
the use of VaR, that is to say Value at Risk –method. VaR takes into account the risk that 
arise from market volatility and it supports diversification of the asset portfolio. The VaR- 
measure is calculated with a 10-day time horizon and a 99% confidence level. It is the 
loss that has a 1% chance of being exceeded over a 10-day period. The capital requirement 
is 
max(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑐 × 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑔) + 𝑆𝑅𝐶    (1) 
where VaRavg is the average value-at-risk over the last 60 days, VaRt-1 is the previous 
day’s value-at-risk. SRC is a specific risk charge and mc is a multiplicative factor. The 
minimum value for mc is three. VaR indicates movements in several market valuables, 




3.2 Basel II 
Basel II was published in 2004 and its implementation started in 2007. It must be noted 
that the implementation of Basel II begun at the same time as the financial crisis. That is 
to say that the panacea for the troubles was to fix something that was already broken. It 
is hard to say whether if the Basel II requirements would have been in place years earlier, 
has the financial crises taken place or had it been so severe. However, Basel II is still the 
base for the todays’ Basel III and its understanding is essential. Basel II is based on three 
pillars;  
1. Minimum Capital Requirements 
2. Supervisory Review 
3. Market Discipline (Hull 2012, 268) 
This study concentrates only on Pillar 1 – Minimum Capital Requirements. As a reform, 
Basel II took into account the credit ratings of the borrowing corporates. It states that  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 0.08 × (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴 + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴 +
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴)      (2) 
where RWA is the amount of risk weighted assets. The capital requirement of 8 % of risk 
weighted assets remained the same as in Basel I but now operational risk was also in-
cluded. (Hull 2012, 268) 
Credit risk capital is calculated in a new manner where it reflects the credit rating of 
obligors or the bank’s own calculations of the default probabilities. There is three differ-
ent approaches to compute the amount of credit risk capital needed. The first is The Stand-
ardized Approach which is used by banks that are not advanced enough to use the internal 
ratings approach. It is similar to Basel I apart from the calculation of risk weights. Table 
1 summarizes some of the new rules and is presented as in Hull 2012, 270.  
 





The second way to calculate the needed credit risk capital is The Foundation Internal 
Ratings Based (IRB) Approach. Regulators base the amount of capital to VaR14 and the 
capital now equals to 𝑉𝑎𝑅 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠. On the next page the figure 4 shows the 
model underlying the IRB approach as it is drawn in Hull 2012, 272.  
 
Figure 5  The loss probability density function and the capital required by 
a financial institution 
 
Under the Foundation IRB, banks supply the probability that the counterparty will default 
within one year (PD) while the loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default EAD 
and the maturity of the exposure (M) are supervisory values set by the Basel committee. 
The third remedy to compute credit risk capital is The Advanced IRB Approach. It di-
verges from the Foundation IRB by estimating its own values to LGD, EAD and M for 
corporate, sovereign and bank exposures. (Hull 2012, 274-275) 
Basel II also introduces operational risk to the minimum capital requirements. Opera-
tional risk originates from a situation where a bank cannot function as it is supposed to. 
The risk threatens a bank’s daily operations. The assessed capital to cover operational risk 
is calculated by using one of the three different approaches: 
1. The Basic Indicator Approach 
2. The Standardized Approach 
3. The Advanced Measurement Approach 
The sophistication of the bank determines which of these approaches is used. The first, 
the basic indicator approach, rules that 
                                                 
14 Calculated by using one-year time horizon and a 99.9% confidence level. 
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𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 0.15 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒15   (3) 
The second one, the standardized approach, applies different factors to gross incomes 
from different business lines. Otherwise it is closed to the basic indicator approach. The 
third one, the advanced measurement approach, allows a bank to use its own internal 
models to calculate an operational risk loss that is 99.9% sure will not be exceeded within 
one year. (Hull 2012, 277-278) 
3.3 Basel 2.5 and Basel III 
As Basel II was implemented so close to the beginning of the financial crisis, in 2007, it 
needed some modifications to meet the needs of the unstable financial world. Basel 2.5 
was implemented in 2011 and it brought about three important adjustments to raise more 
market risk capital compared to Basel II.  
1. The calculation of a stressed VaR 
2. A new incremental risk charge 
3. A comprehensive risk measure for instruments dependent on credit correlation 
Compared to the VaR measure calculated by using a one to four year VaR, stressed 
VaR is measured by using 250-days period of stressed market conditions. To formulate 
the total capital charge banks must calculate the regular VaR and the stressed VaR.  
max(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑐 × 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑔) + max (𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑠 × 𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑔)   (4) 
Where VaRt-1 and sVaRt-1 are VaR and stressed VaR computed on the previous day, 
with a 10-day time horizon and a 99% confidence level. VaRavg and sVaRavg are the av-
erages of VaR and stressed VaR over the previous 60 days, with a 10-day time horizon 
and a 99% confidence level. Mc and ms are multiplicative factors determined by banks, 
although they must be at least equal to three. 
Incremental risk charge (IRC) brought into line bank’s trading book and their banking 
book. IRC ruled out banks gimmicking habits to securitize their loans in their banking 
book to lower its regulatory capital. The IRC requires banks to calculate a one-year 99.9% 
VaR for losses from credit sensitive products in the trading book. The Comprehensive 
                                                 




Risk Measure (CRM) perceives the risk of instruments that are vulnerable to the correla-
tions between the default risks of different assets. These instruments are such as asset-
backed securities (ABSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). These instruments 
were especially fragile in the financial crisis. To calculate CRM capital charge the bank 
uses percentages of the securitizations as shown in the 2 table below. (Hull 2012, 288) 
 




For unrated companies banks are allowed to apply their own internal models to calcu-
late the CRM. This again, leaves room for maneuver and error for the banks own risk 
assessments. However, this study will return on this matter later on.  
Although, Basel 2.5 made major improvements considering market risk, Basel III still 
needed to better perceive credit and liquidity risk and also tighten the definition of capital. 
There are six different parts to the Basel III regulations which are observed more closely 
below: 
1. Capital Definition and Requirements 
2. Capital Conservation Buffer 
3. Countercyclical Buffer 
4. Leverage Ratio 
5. Liquidity Risk 
6. Counterparty credit risk 
The implementation of these regulations begun in 2013 and will continue gradually 
until 2019. (Hull 2012, 286–289) 
3.3.1 Capital definition and requirements 
Basel III defines total capital into three categories: 
1. Tier 1 equity capital also known as core Tier 1 capital 
2. Additional Tier 1 capital 
3. Tier 2 capital 
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Tier 1 capital includes share capital and retained earnings but it does not contain good-
will or deferred tax assets. Common equity, or Tier 1 equity, is referred as going concern 
capital and it means that it is able to absorb losses. Tier 2 capital is known as gone-concern 
capital and when the bank is insolvent, all the losses are absorbed by Tier 2 capital. As 
long as Tier 2 capital is positive, all the lenders to the bank should be paid fully back. 
Tier 1 equity capital is adjusted to be at least 4.5% of risk weighted assets at all times. 
Tier 1 equity capital and additional Tier 1 capital needs to be at least 6% of risk weighted 
assets at all time. The whole total capital, that is to say Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is required 
to be at least 8% of risk weighted assets at all time. (Hull 2012, 289-290) 
As these percentages are only considered to be a portion of the risk weighted assets, 
one cannot but to ponder what inaccuracies the risk weighting holds inside. By using risk-
weights, banks are relying on the market monitors’ capability of rating companies cor-
rectly. In addition, for smaller companies which have no rating, they are allowed to rate 
themselves. Also securitizing financial instruments makes it hard to rate them and estab-
lish their risks accurately. If capital and reserves are compared to the whole balance sheet 
of a Finnish bank, for instance in 2012 the percentage reduces from 15.8% (Finanssival-
vonta, tilinpäätösten avainluvut) to only 4% (Statistical Data Warehouse, European Cen-
tral Bank). The use of risk weights means that decreasing amount of capital is supposed 
to bear even a bigger balance sheet. 
3.3.2 Capital conservation buffer 
Capital conservation buffer’s aim is to ensure that banks have enough capital to bear 
losses during financial crisis. It requires banks to collect more Tier 1 equity capital during 
normal financial circumstances to ensure their solidity during economic down turns. Dur-
ing normal times a bank’s capital conservation buffer, that is core Tier 1 equity, must be 
at least 2.5% more than usual of risk weighted assets. This means that the Tier 1 capital 
is required to be at least 7% of risk weighted assets during normal times. Furthermore, if 
the capital conservation buffer has been partially used up, banks are forbidden to share 
dividends until the buffer has been restored. (Hull 2012, 290–291) 
The definition of normal times is yet to been seen. Since the highest regulatory organ 
to superintend the regulation is the European Central Bank’s observers, the fickle phrase 
of normal times may cause problems and divide consistent line of uniform regulation. For 
instance in the European Union, there is many structurally different member countries 
which may interpret the normal times differently. Although, Europe as a whole may seem 
blooming, one member country can struggle to find economic growth. Then the struggling 
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country may find it hard to expand their conservation buffer. As this leads to the prohibi-
tion of dividend sharing, bank investors may transfer their money to other countries’ 
banks and therefore even worsen the situation for the already struggling banks.  
3.3.3 Countercyclical buffer 
Bank earning depends on business cycles. To protect a bank from the cyclicality Basel III 
regulates a countercyclical buffer, which can set to between 0–2.5 percent of risk 
weighted assets. The extension of its implementation is determined by the authority of 
the country at issue. (Hull 2012, 292) The counter cyclicality will be discussed more 
closely in section 3.4. 
3.3.4 Leverage ratio 
Basel III defines a minimum leverage ratio which is 3%. This ratio considers the risk of 
risk weighting, since it is measured by capital to total exposure (Hull 2012, 292). The 
adding of 3% leverage ratio to Basel III is a step towards right direction as the total ex-
posure includes all items on the balance sheet without any risk-weights and also some 
off-balance sheet items like loan commitments. Leverage ratio however is expected to be 
introduced as late as 2018. The difference between risk weighted assets and the total as-
sets is that the risk weighted assets rely on a correct rating of a credit agency, such as 
Moody’s or S&P’s. In the 2007 financial crash, many banks lost a lot of capital because 
they had invested in ABS CDOs16 that had been rated as AAA. Merrill Lynch, for exam-
ple, lost a lot of money from investing in ABS CDOs (Hull 2012, 128–129). The problem 
then relies on the reliability of the ratings. Although, during normal financial times the 
AAA-rating would be correct, during financial turmoil the risk weights are not accurate 
and up-to-date. Some of the ratings can decrease steeply as financial difficulties hit the 
rated companies. 
                                                 









3.4 The effects of the minimum equity ratio on the business cycle 
This section examines whether the Basel requirements amplify the procyclicality of the 
real economy. There have been fears that in an economic down turn, the Basel require-
ments may deepen the coming recession since banks are required to hold on to more eq-
uity that would be natural during economic slumps. The idea behind this is that since 
banks need to raise more equity this comes off from the funds that would otherwise be 
lent to the public. Therefore the lending market becomes thinner and the banks’ client 
firms are not able to invest. The effect of the minimum equity ratio on the business cycle 
is examined here because the critique against regulation often argue that regulation mag-
nify the business cycle. Of course, there are many other effects that arise from the mini-
mum equity requirements, however, the effect on the business cycle gives this study a 
broader macro economical overview and therefore it is being brought to closer examina-
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Basel II, which was implemented in 2007, has caused concern whether the regulations 
amplify business cycles17. In Basel III the regulators have tried to mitigate the pro-cycli-
cal behavior18 by implementing the countercyclical buffer. Previously used Basel II 
linked capital requirements with risks. These risks are connected to business cycles since 
the measurement of risk, loan grading, follows economical fluctuations. During economic 
down-turns the grading of loans and companies are in general decreasing in value. This 
creates pressure for banks to bring up their equity assets. For this reason Basel III intro-
duced the countercyclical buffer implementation.  
After the Modigliani and Miller theory (1958) argued that the financial structure of a 
firm is irrelevant, the forthcoming real business cycle models left the finance aspect with-
out attention (Freixas & Rochet 2008, 195). However, Bernanke (1983) established a new 
theory to explain the severity of the Great Depression in the 1930’s USA where he took 
the banking view into consideration. He established a lending view approach where sim-
ple causal effect was considered; banks with liquidity shortages lend less (Freixas & 
Rochet 2008, 198). This argument is against the view of high equity requirements causing 
banks restrict their lending and actually points towards the opposite. In addition Mina-
mihashi (2011, 135) finds that bank failures amplify recession due to falling investments. 
He estimates that the failing banks’ client firms reduce their investments by nearly 30 % 
because they stagnate their activities under the credit crunch19. As Minamihashi (2011, 
137—138) acknowledges, the literacy of bank failures effecting the real economy faces 
two main problems; banks’ secret client lists and shock identification. Since banks are 
obligated to secrecy about their clients, there is no data to identify which client belongs 
to which bank. Therefore there is no way to link the failed banks to their failed customers. 
However, Minamihashi finds that Japanese banks are required to identify their lenders 
and as a result uses the data of failed Japanese banks and their customers to research the 
effect of a bank failure to the real economy. He finds that bank failures decrease the in-
vestments made by their client firms by approximately 30 %. He comes to a conclusion 
                                                 
17 Business cycles are periodical fluctuations in economic activity. They are usually measured in 
the changes in GDP.  
18 In this thesis, the term pro-cyclicality refers to the phenomenon when banks increase their cap-
ital reserves during economical down-turn and decrease them during business booms.  
19 Credit crunch describes the situation when the lending activity is diminished because of the 
uncertain world states. Banks stop lending money to each other and clients because they cannot 
be certain whether the receiving bank (or a firm) is solvent. This leads to a situation when the 
whole lending market is frozen. 
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that bank failures can trigger and deepen recessions because they impose severe credit 
crunches on their clients (Minamihashi 2011, 153). 
Repullo and Suarez (2012) discuss what the effect of Basel II really was to the business 
cycles. They define that Basel II was in the middle between the arguments whether the 
procyclicality of bank regulation is a necessary evil or something that should be explicitly 
corrected (452—453). As Basel III was implemented recently Repullo and Suarez only 
cautiously take a stand that the reforms introduced in the Basel III is a move to the right 
direction. However, they conclude that that with the interaction of relationship lending 
and friction in banks’ access to equity markets has the potential to cause significant cy-
clical swings in the credit supply. Repullo and Suarez (2012, 483) stress that their findings 
show that the swings are highlighted under the risk-based requirements of Basel II com-
pared to the flat requirements of Basel I. The main critique from Repullo and Saurina 
(2012) is directed to the use of credit-to-GDP gap to signal the increase and decrease of 
the countercyclical buffer of Basel III. They find that the correlation between GDP growth 
and the credit-to-GDP gap is negative and so it is also between the GDP growth and the 
countercyclical capital buffer. They conclude that the Basel committee’s decision to 
choose credit-to-GDP gap as the common reference point to take buffer decisions increase 
the procyclicality of the Basel III. They specify that its negative correlation with the GDP 
growth means that the credit-to-GDP gap tends to signal to reduce capital requirements 
when GDP growth is high and to increase the requirements when GDP growth is low. 
This increases the business cycles. (Repullo & Saurina 2012, 8—13) This stands against 
the mandate of building buffers in good times and releasing them during economic down 
turns. As an alternative Repullo and Saurina (2012, 16—18) suggest to use credit growth 
as the reference point instead of credit-to-GDP gap.  
Alternatively, Jokivuolle, Pesola and Viren (2015, 117—118) argue that the credit-to-
GDP is a good measure for setting countercyclical capital buffers. With the data of nine 
European countries, they examine the effect of private indebtedness to the bank losses 
when there is a drop in output. As an example they mention Finland, where the severe 
drop in output in 2009 did not cause a serious amount of losses in bank loans. This, they 
say, was accounted for the low private indebtedness. Their conclusion is that banking 
crisis depend on three macro-economic factors: output growth shock, real interest rate 
and excessive indebtedness of the private sector. To measure the excessiveness of the 
indebtedness of the private sector is simply to use the trend deviation of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. As economy cannot control output changes directly, and interest rates’ policy in-
struments are affected by several other goals, Jokivuolle et al. suggest that Basel III’s idea 
to base countercyclical buffers on the trend deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio is in the 
right tracks (2015, 125).   
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4 THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MORE HIGHLY CAPI-
TALIZED BANKS  
This chapter evaluates the costs and benefits of more highly capitalized banks. As argued 
before there are many different views on whether more equity induces costs or benefits 
to the banks and the public. An argument towards that more equity denotes higher capital 
costs argues that more equity leads to greater payments to shareholders since the required 
return on equity is higher than the required return on debt. Controversially these costs 
will be shifted to the bank’s customers through increasing bank costs for example issuing 
higher loan margins. If continued on this argument it is shown that this kind of stricter 
loan granting will lead to decreasing investments and therefore it will unfavorable affect 
the whole economy.  
On the other hand, highly leveraged banks are more vulnerable to economic crisis. If 
assumed that higher equity requirements will not raise the average cost of capital, there 
is no valid reason to argue against higher capital requirements. Alternatively if the as-
sumption is relaxed, it is still evident that the higher capital costs to the bank will be 
balanced out by the more reliable banking industry to the public. As there is now only a 
little chance for a higher equity bank to be declared bankrupt, the public’s chance to bail 
the banks out will also decrease. This leads to a more trustful community and an economy 
that is not as vulnerable to crisis as before.  
Although is it quite easy to measure the costs of capital, it is not, however, as easy to 
measure the benefits of capital. There might be arguments that it is incompetent to even 
compare the costs that will generally be borne by banks and the benefits yielded to the 
general public. Nevertheless, as said before the banks are likely to shift the costs of more 
equity to the public, and therefore the comparison becomes significant.  
This chapter will at first discuss whether Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group fulfill 
the requirements of Basel III. As it was established in chapter 2, the capital structure of a 
bank affects its required ROE. This study then moves to examine the validity of this state-
ment in the banking industry.  This chapter looks into the issue to what extent the MM-
theory holds for banks. The chapter follows closely Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano’s 
article Optimal bank capital (2012), which studied the same question by examining data 
from banks in Great Britain. After measuring the cost-validity of higher equity require-
ments this chapter turns to measure the benefits of higher equity ratios. Of course this 
necessitates the quantification and specific definition of the benefits which the chapter 
also covers. 
As said before, many have argued that as banks are important institutions, they are 
usually considered too-big-to-fail, and, in case of insolvency, national governments will 
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bail them out. This would mean that the MM-theory does not hold for banks since they 
are in no risk of bankruptcy. In Finland the government has established a deposit guar-
antee fund which covers all private persons, companies, foundations, municipalities and 
parishes and it secures the deposits to the maximum of 100 000 euros per bank. The de-
posit guarantee is bank-specific and both Nordea Bank Finland Oyj and Danske Bank Oyj 
deposits are guaranteed (The deposit guarantee fund). With attributes like mentioned 
above, it seems unlikely that the Modigliani and Miller theory is adequate for banks.  
4.1 Do Danske Bank and Nordea Meet the Requirements? 
In this section Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group’s financial statements’ key figures 
are compared to those of required by Basel III. In this section we face the problem of risk-
weighting yet again. As can be expected, both Nordea and Danske Bank manage their 
required capital ratios well.  
 
Table 3 Required amount of CET1, T1 and T220 capital over  











CET1CAPITAL/RWA 15,7 14,2 15,1 13,9 >7% 
(T1+T2)/RWA 20,1 15,2 14,5 19,3 >8% 
 
Danske Bank and Nordea both have almost double the required amount of both CET1 
Capital and Tier1 and Tier 2 capital. If equity capital is perceived expensive then how 
come these two banks hold almost double the amount required? Easy conclusion would 
be that the banks do not think equity capital that expensive after all. However, as has been 
seen before, risk-weighting is not an easy task for banks. Therefore it also could be that 
having an extra amount of equity capital is preparation for the problem that risk-weighting 
                                                 
20 As defined in section 3.3.1; Tier 1 capital includes share capital and retained earnings but it does 
not contain goodwill or deferred tax assets. Common equity, or Tier 1 equity, is referred as going 
concern capital and it means that it is able to absorb losses. Tier 2 capital is known as gone-concern 
capital and when the bank is insolvent, all the losses are absorbed by Tier 2 capital. 
21 In this table, the figures from Nordea and Danske Bank are from the year 2013 (Danske Bank 
and Nordea’s annual reports).  
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is not accurate. If a bank inspector was to point out that the risk assessment is not strict 
enough, then the banks would already have the extra amount of equity capital required. 
On the other hand, it may seem irrelevant to calculate the cost of doubling equity ratios 
when the current level of equity is already notably higher than the required level to begin 
with. However, in this study the calculations are meant to test whether the higher equity 
requirements would rise the funding costs of banking substantially. It will be seen in Sec-
tion 5 that costs are not as high as feared. Also it is worth speculating whether an increase 
of the required equity over risk-weighted assets for instance to 20 percent would save the 
industry a whole lot of monitoring costs. One important area of study would be to measure 
how much the new regulatory regime costs for banks as monitoring costs.  
Although Danske Bank and Nordea hold more equity than required by Basel agree-
ment, they probably do so to prepare themselves for rising loan demand. Banks’ loan 
demand can rise suddenly. If the equity rate is already at the minimum level, the bank 
cannot grant these new loans. However, if the bank has enough leeway between their 
actual equity rate and the required one, they will be able to grant the new loans without 
breaking the requirements. On the contrary, a bank that only just meets the requirements 
may suffer from bad debt that consumes the bank’s equity even more. To be able to meet 
the required equity rate, the bank may have to give up some of its good and healthy loans 
to balance out the consumed equity. This cause and effect cannot be beneficial to the bank 
or to the public. Yet, if the bank had additional equity to begin with, it would still meet 
the requirements after the bad debt and would not have to cut off its loan supply. Addi-
tional equity therefore creates elasticity. When interpreting the Danske Bank and 
Nordea’s figures of 2013, is it easy to see why they have willingly doubled their equity 
ratios compared to the required ones. Still, this does not mean that the banks’ equity re-
quirements could be doubled without any consequences. If the requirements were to be 
doubled, the banks would probably react to the new requirements by yet again with even 
more additional equity to serve the possibility of adapting to the moves in loan demand.  
Nevertheless, the depositors might not trust the solvency of a bank, even though it met 
the capital requirements. To get the depositors to trust in a bank’s safety, it might have to 
operate on a higher equity level than required.   
4.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model and the size of the equity beta 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is used to calculate the expected return of an asset, for 
instance, a stock. Capital Asset Pricing Model perceives the capital risk of a firm in its 
beta (βasset). It denotes that the risk of bank’s assets can be broken in to two parts; risks 
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borne by equity holders (βequity) and by debt holders (βdebt). As this study is interested in 
the required return on equity and the cost of equity it is important to look how the risks 
of different capital instruments, now equity and debt, are calculated. βequity depends upon 
the correlation between the rate of return of a firm’s share and that of the market as a 
whole, so the Capital Asset Pricing Model is 
 






 ,   (5) 
 
where E is the equity and D is the debt of a bank. If we assume the debt holder’s risk to 
be zero (βdebt=0)
22  equation (1) will become: 
 
    𝛽𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐷+𝐸
𝐸




  is the leverage. From the equation (5) one can see the link between the MM-
theory and Capital Asset Pricing Model. If βdebt is zero the risk premium on equity de-
clines linearly with leverage. For example if a bank halves its leverage, each unit of equity 
should now bear only half of the risk as before, otherwise the βequity should fall by half. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model would then imply that the risk premium on that equity 
should also fall by one half. (Miles et al. 2012) In chapter 5 this study tests how this works 
for banks operating in Finland. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model illustrates the relationship between the expected returns 
and risks. The return to the shareholders always contains risk and this risk is rewarded 
with risk premium, a premium paid for the shareholders to compensate the risk. The Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model suggests that the expected returns of the risky investment must 
be higher than risk-free investment’s since risk averse shareholders require compensation 
to invest in risky shares.  
Miles et al. (2012) find that the equity premium is the key in assessing the bank’s cost 
of capital because it is the only difference between the cost of debt and the rate of return 
of equity that matters. They find that the impact of leverage on beta is highly significant 
and that the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Modigliani and Miller theory –joint hypoth-
esis conditions do not hold. They confirm this by using their estimates to assess how the 
                                                 
22 This is based on the assumption that the fluctuations in the value of the debt are not correlated 
with the general market movements. The debt grantors and holders are eager to avoid risk that 
would arise from binding the debt value to the general market fluctuations. Hence, debt’s com-
pensation is generally tied to interest rates which are not as volatile as shares for instance. 
41 
 
change in leverage affects the average cost of bank funds. They estimate that with an 
approximately 15% required return on equity the cost of capital, at a 30%-leverage and a 
5% risk-free interest rate, is 5.33%. When they halve the leverage to 15% the cost of 
capital rises to 12.6%. (Miles et al. 2012, 11—13). If Modigliani and Miller theory held 
for banks the change in leverage would not have affected the original cost of capital, 
5.33%. Nonetheless, if the Modigliani and Miller theory had not hold for banks at all, the 
change in leverage would not have had any impact on the required return on equity. It is 
concluded that the Modigliani and Miller theory holds for bank to some extent. 
The extent to which the Modigliani and Miller theory holds, is important to 
acknowledge since it is the main theory where this study bases its assumptions about the 
controversy between leverage and the cost of capital. If the Modigliani and Miller theory 
holds for banks to some extent, how considerable should this connection be to be relevant? 
Miles et al. (2012, 14) find that compared to a situation where Modigliani and Miller 
theory holds exactly, so when doubling the leverage doubles the risk, the actual rise in 
risk is about 70% of what it would be if the Modigliani and Miller theory held exactly. 
To be noted is that these estimates are not even taking into consideration what will happen 
to the required rate of return on debt as the leverage changes. Of course conclusion is that 
as leverage doubles, also the creditors want more compensation to their now riskier loan. 
However, this assumption is conservative and potentially understates the Modigliani and 
Miller effects. Miles et al. (2012, 15) find when using regression analyst that the Modi-
gliani and Miller theorem effect is between 45%—90% as large as it would be if the 
theory held exactly. Yet in their findings they ignore tax effect. However, the loss that 
incurs to the banks as extra tax payments when the leverage ratio decreases, is offset by 
the revenue the government gains in taxes.  
4.3 The benefits of lower leverage 
To say that highly leveraged banks can cause damage because they are connected with 
credit crunches23 is true but not an accurate statement. Although this study has concen-
trated on the costs of equity financing, the benefits of secured banks must also be studied 
thoroughly.  Only after this study has computed the value of the benefits, can the true 
costs of low equity financing be calculated. In the Optimal bank capital paper (2012, 18) 
Miles et al. quantify the benefit by defining the benefit to be the more robust banking 
                                                 
23 Credit crunch is a situation when all credit activity in the financial sector is frozen because the 
counterparties cannot verify whether the other one is a financially stable company.  
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sector and the lower frequency of banking crisis. They conclude that the benefits of a 
higher equity ratio can be measured as the expected cost of a financial crisis that has been 
avoided. That means that the marginal benefit equals the reduction in the probability of 
banking crisis times the expected cost of a banking crisis. 
There is one key assumption that needs to be taken into account. It is assumed that the 
decrease in the value of banks’ assets is caused by changes in the levels of incomes in the 
economy. To be more precise, if income levels fall then losses will arise to the banks. 
After modelling the process which determines the income level the asset value’s proba-
bility distribution can be calculated. This leads to find the probabilities when the value of 
assets declines more than the value of how much equity there is. This is the probability of 
a banking crisis. From there it is easily seen that when equity levels rise how the proba-
bility of insolvency changes. (Miles et al. 2012, 19.) 
Miles et al. suggest evidence that during recessions that are associated with banking 
crisis the fall in GDP can be proportionally equal to the fall in bank assets. However Miles 
et al. assume that the fall in bank assets for a given fall in incomes is only about a half as 
large as that (19). However, the more international are banks the less tight will be the link 
between movements in domestic incomes and the value of bank assets. Miles et al. (2011, 
20) calculate an example that if GDP falls by 10 % in a year when using the average risk 
weight of 0.45, the fall in assets would be 4.5 %. Now the assets would be worth 95.5 % 
of their start of the year value. A bank with leverage less than 22.2 (1/0.045) would have 
enough capital to absorb this loss.  
4.4 Results of debt guarantee 
Bank’s debt has implicit and explicit guarantee. In Finland the bailer or guarantor is the 
government. This means that a lender does not perceive its loan to a bank as a risky busi-
ness. The government granted safety net skews banks’ loan markets. This leads to a situ-
ation where a bank gets loans under the accurate market price. Alternatively, the guaran-
tee of the government entails that bank owners, also known as equity holders, do not need 
to compensate creditors fully for the risk of the debt. As the government guarantee is 
considered to exist for the safety of depositors, and banks do not pay any premium for it, 
it can be examined as subsidy to the bank owners. (Vale 2011, 4) 
Inevitably, such a benefit will have an effect on the validity of the MM-theorem. To 
see the effect it is necessary to draw a distinction between social and private funding 
costs. The social funding costs consists of three elements: the required return on equity, 
the required return to the debt holders, and the cost to the guarantor of being paid less 
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than the actual security premium for the debt guarantee24. The total social funding costs, 
SFC, can be written as  
𝑆𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅𝐸(𝑒)𝑒 + 𝑅𝐷𝑔(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒] + 𝑃(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒]    (7) 
and when SFC is differentiated w.r.t. e, the dSFC will then be 
𝑑𝑆𝐹𝐶 = [𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷𝑔 − 𝑃]𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
𝑒 × 𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐷𝑔
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 = 0 (8) 
where RDg is the required return on debt in presence of a debt guarantee, and P is the cost 
of the guarantee to the guarantor, that is the cost of being paid less than the actuarially 
fair premium for the debt guarantee. It must be noted that P is negative in e i.e., a higher 
equity implies lower cost of the debt guarantee. The second equation (8) states that when 
taking into account all the social funding costs that is to include all the costs borne by all 
parties, the MM-theory still holds. An increase in the equity ratio will not affect the total 
social funding costs. However, the distribution of the costs will change between the three 
parties. Now a higher equity ratio implies a lower cost for the guarantor, hence the term  
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 is negative. The guarantor will now get all the benefits from the raising of 
equity ratio. For creditors there will be some benefit or none since the term  
𝜕𝑅𝐷𝑔
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 is negative or equal to zero depending on whether the guarantee is partial 
or full. The term  
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
𝑒 is negative and a higher equity ratio implies a less volatile value 
of the bank’s equity for a given volatility of the bank’s assets. The first term 
[𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷𝑔 − 𝑃]𝑑𝑒 is positive since the required ROE is always larger than the required 
return on debt plus the cost of the debt guarantee. (Vale 2011, 4—5) 
The total private funding costs PFC are the total social funding costs minus the guar-
antor’s cost of the debt guarantee. 
𝑃𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅𝐸(𝑒)𝑒 + 𝑅𝐷𝑔(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒]   (9) 
Now it is essential to see how these private funding costs are affected by an increase 




[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 < 0. Noticing this we will get  
                                                 
24 𝑅𝐸(𝑒)𝑒 means the required return on equity, 𝑅𝐷𝑔(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒] indicates the required return to the 
debt holders and 𝑃(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒] is the security premium of the debt guarantee. 
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𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐶 = [𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷𝑔]𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
𝑒 × 𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐷𝑔
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 > 0  (10) 
From here it can be seen that the bank cannot fully enjoy all of the benefits of lower cost 
of debt from raising its equity ratio. Some of the benefits are shifted to the guarantor. It 
can also be thought as the subsidy that the bank gets is now smaller. Therefore the higher 
equity ratio will reduce the value of the subsidy inherent in the debt guarantee. (Vale 
2011, 5—6) 
In Vale’s study (2011, 6—9) he finds that the increase in DnB NOR Bank’s equity 
ratio from 5,51 per cent to 11,02 percent inflicts a growth in private funding costs of 57 
basis points in the naïve example.  Nevertheless, when he calculates that the change in 
private funding costs when he uses the estimates of Miles et al. and includes the equity 




5 THE ESTIMATES OF A RISE IN FUNDING COSTS FOR 
BANKS IN FINLAND 
This section will follow the example of Bent Vale (2011) and Miles et al. (2012) and look 
into a case where the equity ratios of Finland’s two largest banks, Nordea and Danske 
Bank25, doubles. Why calculate the doubling of the equity ratio and not for example an 
increase of ten percent? The biggest reason is to be able to compare this study to the 
similar ones made by Vale and Miles et al. In addition, the purpose of this study is to 
show that the increase of equity ratio does not increase the funding costs of a bank in the 
same phase. Also to correct the critique of highly capitalized banks having high funding 
costs, it is necessary to show the exaggerated representation of banks having to double 
their equity ratios to start a conversation to recommend highly capitalized banks.  Section 
five analyzes the effects of the doubling to the funding costs. As Nordea and Danske Bank 
are both global banks operating in Nordic countries, it is hard to come by accurate stock 
market data and annual reports concentrating only on the subsidiaries operating in Fin-
land. For instance Danske Bank Oyj is a subsidiary of Danske Bank Group and the whole 
capital stock of the Finnish subsidiary is owned by the Danish parent company (Danske 
Bank Financial Statement Handout 2013). This leads to a situation where the annual re-
ports of Danske Bank Oyj can be researched but there is no stock market data to be found 
and used in the calculations later on. It is important for the sake of accurate results that 
this thesis does not mix subsidiary and controlling company data. This is the reason why 
only controlling company data is used.   
In this thesis the data is gathered from Datastream of Thompson Reuters. Thomson 
Reuters datastream is a global financial and macro economical database that covers key 
economic indicators for 175 countries and 60 markets. By using the database this study 
has been able to calculate the averages of Nordea and Danske Bank Groups’ annual stock 
returns through 2000—2013. Datastream is also used to calculate the annual average of 
three months Euribor, which is used as a proxy for short term money market debt26. 
By the end of 2013 Nordea Group had a total capital ratio of 18,1% and Danske Bank 
Group had an equity ratio of 21,4% (Annual Reports of Nordea Group and Danske Bank 
                                                 
25 Nordea Suomi Oyj and Danske Bank Oyj are the two largest public limited companies in Fin-
land. Osuuspankki is the second largest banking group in Finland but its company form is co-
operative bank and therefore it cannot be used in this research.  
26 Three month euribor is a money market rate that is usually slightly lower than the interest cost 
of a bond debt.  
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Group). Although the equity numbers from the balance sheet seem stable, a common con-
cern is directed towards the ways of measuring and calculating risk. Instead of using the 
ratios which are compared to risk-weighted-assets it is more accurate to compare equity 
to all assets measured in the balance sheet of the banks. This is done because the banks’ 
own calculations of measuring the risks of their assets can be biased. The calculations 
with ratios to all assets changes the numbers enormously. For example as the year 2013 
figures are compared Danske Bank’s and Nordea’s equity ratio declines from 21.4% to 
5.6% and from 18.1% to 4.5% respectively27. Basel regulates the Core Tier 1 Capital ratio 
to be at least over 4.5% and the official numbers of Danske Bank (14.7%) and Nordea 
(14.9%) seem to fulfill this requirement easily. Again these figures are compared to the 
risk-weighted-assets. Once they are divided by all assets the figures fall to 3.9% and 3.7% 
respectively. (Annual Reports of Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group.) To follow the 
example of Miles et al. (2012) and Vale (2011), this study will test the effects of increas-
ing the equity ratios, or doubling them, to 9% for Nordea Group and to 11,2% for Danske 
Bank Group. 
To test how the funding costs react to different equity levels, this thesis uses equity 
measures that are in comparison with all the assets of the representative banks’ balance 
sheets. This way the thesis eliminates uncertainty that originates from the inaccuracies in 
risk weighting. However, to avoid the inaccuracies in risk weighting, this research also 
tests the change in funding costs with equity ratios that are per risk-weighted-assets. 
When testing this, it is good to examine the results skeptically. To perform the test of 
doubling the banks’ equity ratios, assumptions need to be established. First, the assump-
tion of full debt guarantee holds28. Second assumption is that there is no equity premium 
effect. This is a naïve assumption and it can be relaxed later on. As a result of such a small 
sample of banks in Finland, this study uses the estimates of equity-βs based on Miles, 
Yang and Marcheggiano (2012). After calculating the effects of doubling the equity ratio 
for Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group, this chapter finishes with the evaluation of 
the used methods. 
                                                 
27 Total capital ratio comparison is calculated at first by dividing Capital base by risk-weighted 
assets and then by all assets.  
28 I.e. there is no debt premium effect from higher equity ratio. Even though it may seem a little 
bit pessimistic, for the sake of the results, it is better to estimate the effects of funding costs a little 
too high than too low. 
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5.1 A naïve example without equity premium effect 
At first the naive case with no equity premium effect from higher equity ratio is consid-
ered. Then only the first term in equation (10) comes into consideration, that is, we only 
have 𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐶 = [𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷𝑔]𝑑𝑒. In the cases of Nordea Group and Danske Bank Group,  𝑑𝑒 
is 0,045 and 0,056 respectively. As an estimate for the required return on equity, 𝑅𝐸, we 
use the average annual return on Nordea Group and Danske Bank Group stocks. Danske 
Bank Group stock’s average annual return for the years 2000 through to 2013 was 15,61% 
and Nordea Bank’s was 13,886%. (Datastream). 
To estimate the required return on bank debt, 𝑅𝐷𝑔, it is assumed that when replacing 
the debt with equity, the most expensive parts of debt is firstly replaced. In addition banks 
prefer to hold onto stable bonds and therefore we will assume that banks will reduce their 
short term money market debt. As a proxy of the cost of this debt we use the annual 
average of the three months EURIBOR.  Over the years of 2000–2013 the average three-
month EURIBOR was 2,456%.   
Now we can calculate the naïve estimate of the increase in the banks’ funding costs 
from raising their equity ratios from 0,056 (Danske Bank) and 0,045 (Nordea) to 0,112 
and 0,09 respectively.  
𝑑𝐹𝐶𝑁𝐴𝐼𝑉𝐸,𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑎 = [13,886 − (2,456)] × 0, 045 = 0,51435 𝑜𝑟 51 𝑏𝑝𝑠 
𝑑𝐹𝐶𝑁𝐴𝐼𝑉𝐸,𝐷𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 = [15,61 − (2,456)] × 0,056 = 0,736624 𝑜𝑟 74 𝑏𝑝𝑠 
With these figures it is easy to see that the growth in financial costs is not tremendous. 
Actually, if these banks double their amounts of equity, their financial costs will grow 
only by 0,51 (Nordea) and 0,74 (Danske Bank) percentages. These results are in line with 
Vale (2011) and Miles et al. (2012), although, they are higher than the previous results. 
This can be explained by Nordea and Danske Bank’s bigger share of equity in the first 
place. The results are compared to the previous studies more thoroughly later on in the 
section 5.2. 
To see the range of variation of the calculations more thoroughly it is intriguing to 
check results arising from the equity ratios which are compared to the banks’ own risk-
weighted-assets. In the case of Nordea Group the rise in the funding costs is  
(13,886 − 2,456) × 0,181 = 2, 06883 𝑜𝑟 207 𝑏𝑝𝑠. 
In the case of Danske Bank Group the funding costs rise 
(15,61 − 2,456) × 0,214 = 2,814956 𝑜𝑟 281 𝑏𝑝𝑠. 
These figures mean that if Nordea Group doubles its equity ratio, their funding costs will 
grow by 2,07 percentages. For Danske Bank group it means a rise of 2,81 percentages in 
funding costs. It is important to yet acknowledge that these last figures can be biased by 
the banks’ own risk-weighting evaluation. 
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5.2 Estimates including equity premium effect 
As shown in section 4.2 Miles et al. (2012) estimate the funding costs with different eq-
uity ratios by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Equation (5) in section 4.1 stated 
that the risk of assets is equal to the relative amount of equity multiplied by equity’s risk 
plus the relative amount of debt times the risk of debt. As this section researches the 
outcomes when there is no equity premium effect it must be that there is a full debt guar-





𝛽𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡    (6) 
From this equation it is easy to see that if leverage, 
𝐷+𝐸
𝐸
, is doubled so should the risk of 
equity be doubling.  
Miles et al (2012) had 38 observations of βequity when they researched six UK banks. 
They used Ordinary Least Squares method and Fixed Effect to regress these βequity-figures 
and then used the Capital Asset Pricing Model to measure how the return on bank equity 
depends on bank leverage. They assumed a risk-free interest rate of 5% in other words 
that means a required return on bank debt of 5%. They find that under reasonable assump-
tions even the doubling of the bank capital has modest impact on the average cost of bank 
funds. The rise in costs range between under 10 bps to under 40 bps. (Miles et al. 2012, 
8—18.) 
To create the same test for banks operating in Finland, the test encounters problems. 
Altogether there is only a few different banks operating in Finland. And only two of the 
few is publicly listed commercial bank. This creates a problem of lacking data when re-
gressing the βequity-figures for Finnish banks. In this paper the problem is solved by using 
the same method as Vale (2011) and partially relying on the parameter estimates from 
Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2012)29.  
Vale (2011, 8) starts the test by calculating the equity risk premium for the whole 
market, 𝑅𝑝. To find 𝑅𝑝, it is important to examine the 𝛽𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 regression from Miles et 
al. 
                                                 
29 Vale used the parameter estimates as they were in Miles et al. in their 2011 paper Optimal Bank 
Capital. In this research the 2012 version of the same paper is used. There is only a few differences 
between the papers and none of them concerns the parameter estimates. 
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𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝒃 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     (11)  
 
where for every bank i at time t, βit is the estimated semi-annual equity beta. X’it is a 
vector of regressors which include leverage and year dummies. b is a vector of parame-
ters. (Miles et al. 2012, 9.) These predicted equity betas are embedded into the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model to get an estimate on how the return on bank equity depends on 
leverage. Here REquity stands for the required return on equity, Rf is the risk-free interest 
rate, â is a constant, ?̂? is the coefficient on leverage from the beta regressions and Rp 
stands for equity risk premium (Miles et al. 2012, 12).  
𝑅𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑅𝑓 + (?̂? + ?̂? ×
𝐷+𝐸
𝐸
)𝑅𝑝   (12) 
Now it is assumed that equation 12, as estimated by Miles et al., holds also for Danske 
Bank Group and Nordea Group30. Furthermore REquity is the average annual return on the 
Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group shares. The time line goes from the year 2000 to 
2013 REquity, Danske Bank during these years was15,61 per cent and REquity, Nordea is similarly 
13,89 per cent. For the same period of time the European Central Bank’s average key 
policy rate was 2,21 per cent and it is used as a dummy for the riskless rate. Again this 
research focuses on two cases; equity ratio measured over risk-weighted-assets and also 
over all assets. Table 3 below shows the figures that are used next in a more concise form.  
 
Table 4 Equity and Gearing ratios 2013 
 
 
The inverse of both banks’ equity ratio is gearing ratio and in these cases for Danske Bank 
it is 4,673 (over risk-weighted-assets) and 17,857 (over all assets) per cent. For Nordea 
the gearing ratios are 5,525 (over risk-weighted-assets) and 22,222 (over all assets) per 
cent. 
                                                 
30 Of course using parameters from multiple UK banks to two specific Finnish banks includes 
inaccuracies. Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is generally evaluate the costs of a higher 
equity ratio to Finnish banks and therefore, these inaccuracies borne are not in the center of this 
study. 
Danske Bank Group Nordea Group
Equity/RWA 21,4 18,1
Equity/Assets 5,6 4,5
Gearing RatioRWA 4,673 % 5,525 %
Gearing RatioASSETS 17,857 % 22,222 %
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Now to calculate market equity premium, Rp, the initial required return on equity 
(ROE), risk-free return Rf, gearing ratio and coefficients for â and ?̂? as found in Miles et 
al. (2012, 10—14) are entered to the equation 12. After finding the Rp it is easy to calcu-
late the new required return on equity (ROE) with the halved leverage. After this, the 
private funding costs (PFC) can be calculated after halving the leverage by using equation 
9. This new private funding cost is then compared to the initial private funding cost to the 
bank. Below in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 the results of these calculations are shown and com-
pressed into tables for each bank.  
5.2.1 Analyzing the changes in funding costs for Danske Bank Group 
For Danske Bank, the doubling of their equity ratio, when measured by equity over all 
assets, increases their funding costs in the range of 16 to 54 bps. This result takes into 
consideration that as equity ratio rises, the required return on equity decreases. It is a clear 
assumption because riskiness of the bank falls as their equity ratio increases. This result 
is smaller than in the naïve example previously, 74 bps. These results illustrate that the 
naïve manner of calculation may overestimate the results. Miles et al. (2012) and Vale 
(2011) both calculated similar results. Table 4 next page, shows the increase in private 
funding costs (PFC) using both linear and log-linear specification. It also shows the re-
sults of two different estimation methods, Ordinary least squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects 
(FE), and it can be seen from the results that they do not differ outstandingly. Table 4 also 
demonstrates how the Return on equity falls after the leverage of Danske Bank is cut in 
half. This is explained by the fact that as the risks of debt are now fallen as well, the 
bank’s investors are now requiring less profit for their investment.  
 
Table 5 Costs of doubling equity over assets -ratio for Danske Bank  
 
DANSKE BANK (EQUITY/ASSETS)      
Β-LEVERAGE EQUATION Linear specification Log-linear specification 
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS FE   OLS FE 
INITIAL ROE 15,61 15,61  15,61 15,61 
ININTIAL PRIVATE FUNDING COSTS (PFC) 3,19 3,19  3,19 3,19 
MARKET EQUITY PREMIUM RP 7,96 8,24  9,63 9,91 
ROE AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 13,83 13,33  11,04 10,50 
PFC AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 3,73 3,67  3,42 3,36 
INCREASE IN PFC 0,54 0,48  0,22 0,16 




For thorough examination, also the risk-weighting of assets must be taken into consid-
eration. On next page table 5 illustrates the changes in funding costs after doubling the 
equity over risk-weighted-assets -ratio. It is shown that the table 5 estimates a greater 
increase in Danske Bank’s funding costs. However, the raise in costs is nowhere near the 
doubling of the costs. This was also the case in the figures of table 4. It is therefore shown 
that the costs do not grow linearly with the raising of equity ratio. As can be seen from 
the table 5, in the log-linear specification the rise in private funding costs is between 63 
and 86 bps. However, the market equity premium is significantly higher in the log-linear 
specification.   
 
Table 6 Costs of doubling equity over risk-weighted-assets -ratio for Danske 
Bank 
 
DANSKE BANK (EQUITY/RWA)      
Β-LEVERAGE EQUATION Linear specification Log-linear specification 
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS FE   OLS FE 
INITIAL ROE 15,61 15,61  15,61 15,61 
ININTIAL PRIVATE FUNDING COSTS (PFC) 5,27 5,27  5,27 5,27 
MARKET EQUITY PREMIUM RP 9,89 11,01  21,59 25,06 
ROE AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 15,03 14,81  11,04 10,50 
PFC AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 7,84 7,74  6,13 5,90 
INCREASE IN PFC 2,57 2,47  0,86 0,63 
INCREASE IN PFC, NAIVE METHOD 0,74 0,74   0,74 0,74 
 
However, in the case where the degree of self-sufficiency is measured as equity over 
risk-weighted assets, the increase in private funding costs is outstanding. It ranges from 
63 to 257 bps. When comparing this result to the one obtained from the equity over assets 
–calculations, the great difference cannot be overlooked. The high value of the difference 
arises question of which manner of calculation is more accurate and reliable.  
As pointed out before, one of the key questions is who bears the costs. Previously the 
public was to collect the risks of overleveraged banks. If the banks move the costs directly 
to the bank lenders, otherwise the public, how will this affect the overall economy? Miles 
et al. (2012, 16) assume that the banks pass on the increasing funding cost to the lending 
rates one-for-one. This means that the cost of lending to the public would increase by 
0,63% to 2,57% . The study will briefly return on this matter in the chapter 6.  
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5.2.2 Analyzing the changes in funding costs for Nordea Group 
Mimicking the custom of research from the previous section, this subdivision shows the 
same calculations when using the data of Nordea Group. In table 6 the calculations are 
based on the percentages of equity over assets -ratio whereas the figures of table 7 are 
measured on equity over risk-weighted assets basis. 
 
Table 7 Costs of doubling equity over assets -ratio for Nordea  
 
NORDEA (EQUITY/ASSETS)      
Β-LEVERAGE EQUATION Linear specification Log-linear specification 
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS FE   OLS FE 
INITIAL ROE 13,89 13,89  13,89 13,89 
INITIAL PRIVATE FUNDING 
COSTS (PFC) 
2,97 2,97  2,97 2,97 
MARKET EQUITY PREMIUM RP 6,51 6,63  7,36 7,43 
ROE AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 12,08 11,61  9,91 9,44 
PFC AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 3,32 3,28  3,13 3,08 
INCREASE IN PFC 0,35 0,31  0,16 0,11 
INCREASE IN PFC, NAIVE 
METHOD 
0,51 0,51   0,51 0,51 
 
Table 6 shows an increase of 11 to 31 bps. The raise in costs is therefore smaller than 
when it was calculated by using the naïve method. Again, the calculations illustrate that 
the raise in costs is not linear with the raise in equity ratio. Nevertheless, a slight increase 
in the private funding costs can be founded.  
The table 7 next page shows the figures when they are calculated by using equity over 
risk-weighted-assets -ratio. Like in the case of Danske Bank group, the increase in private 





Table 8 Costs of doubling equity over risk-weighted-assets -ratio for Nordea 
 
NORDEA (EQUITY/RWA)      
Β-LEVERAGE EQUATION Linear specification Log-linear specification 
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS FE   OLS FE 
INITIAL ROE 13,89 13,89  13,89 13,89 
ININTIAL PRIVATE FUNDING 
COSTS (PFC) 
4,53 4,53  4,53 4,53 
MARKET EQUITY PREMIUM RP 8,49 9,39  17,01 19,45 
ROE AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 13,30 13,09  9,91 9,44 
PFC AFTER HALVED LEVERAGE 6,38 6,30  5,15 4,98 
INCREASE IN PFC 1,86 1,78  0,63 0,46 
INCREASE IN PFC, NAIVE 
METHOD 
0,51 0,51   0,51 0,51 
 
Also, the increase is greater than is was in the naïve method. The growth in private 
funding costs varies from 46 to 186 bps. The 5.3 section will concentrate more on the 
matter of differences between the two ways of measuring equity ratios.   
 
5.3 Evaluation of the used methods 
This section concentrates on the evaluation of computational methods used above. First 
it will look into the used data and its source. Second it focuses on the estimates that orig-
inate from Miles et al. research and their suitability for this study. Third this section con-
centrates on the inaccuracies that arise from the two different ways of measuring equity 
ratios.  
The data used is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Datastream is a global 
financial database operated by Thomson Reuters Corporations. It is one of the largest 
databases worldwide. This research has retrieved all the annual returns used in section 5 
from Datastream. The used required return on equity figures are averages of annual re-
turns of 2000-2013. Hence the time period covers the economic boom of the early 21st 
century and the recession period that started in 2007 and is yet to be solved. The figures 
used to calculate equity and capital ratios are retrieved from Danske Bank Group’s and 
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Nordea Group’s annual reports of 2013. However as there is only a sample of two com-
panies, the results must be interpreted directionally and cannot be generalized. On the 
other hand, this study is the first study to examine Danske Bank Group and Nordea Group 
precisely and therefore the results are suggestive. The reason behind the decision to use 
only two banks as research subjects originates from the small amount of publicly listed 
commercial banks in Finland. However, it must be perceived that due to lacking data from 
the Finnish subsidiaries, this study uses the group level data. On group level both Nordea 
Group and Danske Bank group operate also in other Nordic countries besides Finland.  
To estimate the equity beta for Finnish banks the study again collides with the problem 
of a small sampling frame. To create a plausible and accurate beta regression, the sample 
of two banks in Finland is not sufficiently enough. For this reason, the study copies the 
beta coefficients from the research of Miles et al. (2012). In their examination they used 
six different banks from the UK to create the beta regression. They estimate equity betas 
by using publically traded stock returns together with the FTSE 100 index returns. The 
UK banks in their research are Lloyds TSB, RBS, Barclays, HSBC, Bank of Scotland and 
Halifax that were turned into HBOS later. Because of mergers of Bank of Scotland and 
Halifax to create HBOS, the merged bank HBOS is treated as a continuation of Halifax. 
This leads to the problem of Bank of Scotland not existing after the merger. However, the 
unbalanced panel does not affect the panel estimation in this case. (Miles et al. 2012, 8-
9.) How does this all affect the results in this study? The estimated equity betas are from 
the UK banks. There are differences between the Finnish and the UK banking fields. Yet, 
the beta describes the riskiness of the returns and as the whole banking industry is regu-
lated by Basel III, and the deposit insurance is regulated by the EU directives, the riski-
ness of the returns can be thought as similar. For this reason, even though the use of the 
UK beta estimations causes inaccuracies to the cost of equity calculations, it is the closest 
estimation the study can find. Also for the sake of the results which are with a view to 
observe the size of the impact of the raising equity ratios to the bank equity owners, the 
inaccuracies are not disruptive. 
In this chapter it has been evaluated how much costs a rise in equity ratio would gen-
erate. One of the key issues here is whether the change in financial costs is measured by 
using equity over assets ratio or equity over risk-weighted-assets ratio. The importance 
of the measuring manner stems from the inequality of the two terms. The difference be-
tween the measures when using equity over risk-weighted-assets and equity over assets -
ratios originates from the aberration between the two ratios. It is easy to see that these 
two figures are not equal. Nevertheless, it is disturbing to see how greatly the two differ 
from each other. It again questions the way banks measure and estimate the riskiness of 
their assets. The main difference in the tables 4 and 5 and also 6 and 7 originates from the 
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way of measuring equity ratio. The size of the balance sheet affects the two measures. It 
is important for a bank to have a solid financial standing. However, the internal risk as-
sessment gives banks latitude to whitewash their assets and eventually look more solid 
than they actually are. This is also the difference between equity over assets and equity 
over risk-weighted-assets -ratios.  
Criticism can also be concentrated on the use of Return on Equity to measure the cost 
of equity. As noted earlier in section 2.2, return on equity may not be the best way to 
measure the profitability of equity. The more a bank is leveraged the bigger is the required 
return on the risky owner’s equity. The Modigliani and Miller theory covered in section 
2.2 suggests that the costs of a higher equity level are close to zero. However, in the 
government subsidized banking industry, the Modigliani and Miller effect cannot be 
thought as holding true purely. Nonetheless, as required return on equity is the controver-
sial manner to measure the costs of equity, it cannot be left untouched. The mean of this 
research is to study whether the costs for stock owners rise with the rise in equity capital 







The aim of this research was to evaluate whether there is relative evidence and precious 
research to prove that higher capital ratios for banks do not lead to greatly higher funding 
costs. To study the assertion above, this study has focused on the previous literature, the-
ories, articles and researches and absorbed in two studies of Miles et al. and Vale who 
have already calculated the rise in funding costs that were the result of raising capital 
ratios. At first this study concentrated on different views to equity holding. For instance 
Modigliani and Miller theorem shows that the financial structure of a firm is irrelevant to 
the funding costs. Then the thesis focused on the down-side of over-leverage and tax 
deductibility and the causes of the lack of equity that can be seen in the situations of 
capital crunches and credit contagion. Chapter 3 was engrossed in Basel requirements 
that control the financial standings of banks. Since Basel requirements is the main reasons 
that directs the banks funding behavior, the whole chapter is devoted to explain the regu-
lations. Section 4 is absorbed in the studies of Vale and Miles et al. It will also explain 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model which is essential to understand when reproducing the 
results of Vale and Miles et al. with the data of the two selected Finnish banks of Nordea 
and Danske Bank in chapter 5. The results in section 5 are similar to those of Miles et al. 
and Vale, however the financial standing of Nordea and Danske Bank were somewhat 
different to those banks studied in the previous researches. 
In this research the main focus was on the alleged high price of equity. The chapters 
of this study observe the key findings of Modigliani and Miller (1958), Miles et al. (2012) 
and Vale (2011) about their discoveries on how financial costs behave when equity ratio 
rises. After that it was important to see whether their findings would hold in Finland. 
Modigliani and Miller state that the financial structure of a company is irrelevant to the 
financial costs. Miles et al. gather data from the UK banks and come to conclusion that 
the doubling of the banks’ equity ratios does not double their financial costs at the same 
time. Actually, the doubling of their equity ratio only increases their average financial 
costs somewhere between 10 to 40 basis points. Vale’s findings (2011) support Miles. et 
al. (2012). Vale researched the effects of doubling equity ratio on Norway’s largest bank 
DnB NOR. He finds similar results as Miles et al. When the equity ratio of DnB NOR 
rises from 5.5 to 11 per cent its total funding costs would increase only in the range of 11 
to 41 basis points. Miles et al. (2011) find that the total funding cost for UK banks will 
increase in the range of 8 to 33 basis points. Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010) do a 
similar research with US banks and they find that an increase of 10 percentage points in 
their equity ratios would raise the total funding costs in the range of 24 to 45 basis points. 
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One important research question was to calculate how much Nordea and Danske 
Bank’s funding costs would grow if their equity or capital ratios were doubled. The re-
search found clear answers to the question. Yes, the funding cost of Nordea and Danske 
Bank grow when their leverage is halved. The results however vary tremendously de-
pending on whether the calculations are done with the relationship of equity over all assets 
or equity over risk-weighted assets. For Nordea, the results vary from 11 to 186 basis 
points. For Danske Bank, the results vary between 16 and 257 basis points. The deviation 
of the results cannot be overlooked. It seems to compromise the results. However, the 
results were similar to those of Miles et al. and Vale when the equity ratios were measured 
over all assets. Also by doing this, the study approaches the equity ratio levels of a typical 
European bank. All the raises in funding costs that were above 54 basis points were cal-
culated on the term of risk-weighted assets. It is clear to see that doubling of an equity 
ratio of 4,5 percent to 9 percent keeps the change in more relevant area than doubling it 
from 18,1 percent to 36,2 percent. These were the numbers of Nordea’s equity and capital 
ratios respectively. This thesis clashes again with the fact that both of Nordea’s and 
Danske Bank’s capital ratios were on a high level to begin with.  
The aim of this research has been to solve whether the equity ratios of Finnish banks 
ought to rise to secure banking system during financial difficulties and whether the rise 
generates costs to banks that will undo the positive effects to the economy. At first when 
compared to other OECD countries, it turned out that Finland had one of the lowest capital 
to assets ratio on the banking sector. However, the capital to assets ratio is not an unam-
biguous indicator of the stability of a banking sector. To evaluate whether the banking 
sector can bear risk, it is important to assess the riskiness of the banks’ assets. To do so 
Basel III agreements measures equity over risk-weighted-assets. When bank stability is 
measured by equity over risk-weighted-assets, the banks’ solidities grow sharply in Fin-
land. However, the system relies on the banks’ own risk-weighting methods. Neverthe-
less, all things considered, bank assets or equity operates as a safety buffer against finan-
cial losses.  
The findings concerning Finnish banks, Nordea and Danske Bank, also show that the 
doubling of the equity ratio will not increase total funding costs one to one. However, the 
rise in funding costs for Finnish banks is higher than the findings in the UK and Norway. 
There are many reasons for that. One of the main reasons is nevertheless the fact that 
Finnish banks have higher equity ratios to begin with. The doubling of it therefore lifts it 
a lot higher than in the examples of Miles et al. and Vale. Therefore in this study there 
has also been used the equity over all assets ratio in comparison to the equity over risk-
weighted-assets. The results of equity over all assets are more similar to the other re-
searches discussed in this study. And when considering the risks of risk-weighting assets, 
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the calculations covering capital over all assets can be seen as a more risk-free way of 
studying the results. When doubling Nordea’s equity over risk-weighted-assets ratio the 
private funding costs rise approximately 118 basis points. However, if the rise in funding 
costs is measured by using the ratio of equity over all assets, the rise is only approximately 
23 basis points. This latter figure agrees with Miles et al. and Vale’s results, which land 
between 8 to 41 basis points. For the Nordea and case it can be said that even though the 
bank’s equity levels are high compared to other banking field, even the doubling of their 
equity ratio would not induce remarkably higher funding costs. This result comes in line 
also with Admati et al. (2010). However, in the case of Danske Bank the rise in funding 
costs is slightly steeper. Over risk-weighted assets it is approximately 163 basis points 
and over all assets the increase in the funding costs is approximately 35 basis points. 
As this research has argued, bank equity is not expensive and therefore it should be 
used as a tool to heal the financial system from risky leverage levels. This should be done 
by simplifying the monitoring process by giving banks a clear higher level of equity ratio 
that should be in place all the time. Of course, during recessions and financial crisis there 
could be some room to relax the instructions. As pointed out before, European Central 
Bank has estimated that in 2015 their expenditure for banking supervision is going to be 
around 260 million euros per year (European Central Bank, press release 2014). And 
when adding the costs of consultants for the banks to help them pass the stress tests, the 
overall costs of highly and complexly regulated banking field rise considerably. Can sig-
nificant savings be gained if bank regulation is simplified to cover a certain amount of 
relation between equity and assets? Further investigation on this matter could entail the 
comparison of banks own monitoring costs to the increase in funding costs as equity lev-
els are raised up. The new field of study should also take into consideration the costs that 
central banks and other supervisory bodies gain from all the monitoring. This might occur 
some challenges. 
Further research could also study how to increase the amount of equity with minimum 
possible costs for banks and the public? The decision to do so should be instantaneous 
and come as a surprise to the market. To start, a temporary restriction of dividend pay-
ments would raise the equity to assets ratio immediately with no costs if implemented to 
the whole banking field at the same time. It would be worth examined what other ways 
of raising the equity ratios are sensible.  
Third field of supplementary study would be to investigate whether the increase in 
private funding costs are passed on to the public by one-for-one. Miles et al. (2012, 16) 
assume that the banks pass on the increasing funding cost to the lending rates one-for-
one. Nevertheless, there is more room for researches in this area of study. One way of 
investigating the matter could be to compare the service charges and loan margins of 
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banks before and after the implementation of new Basel rules. Challenges may occur on 
timely basis since the banks might not increase the charges immediately after new regu-
lation. This study might be topical a few years after the final implementation of Basel III 
in 2018.  
Nevertheless, banks are in a special position in the corporate world and in the society. 
Banks create a great part of the money floating through the economy by lending to the 
public. Yet, the global world is going through a digital change and this will affect the 
banking industry when more and more of their customers are changing their way of using 
bank services. This of course creates new companies in the banking industry that will not 
have the conventional brick and mortar offices because all the operations are taken online. 
It could even be compared to the liberalization of banking industry all over again and 
therefore the change should be embraced but also at the same time the banks need to get 
ready for the upcoming convulsion. As before, the liberalization can at first boost the 
banking industry, but within a while, it can cause new problems that the industry has not 
seen before.31To prepare itself for future, the banks should rise their equity levels to assure 
their operations even in economic distress. 
                                                 








For example to calculate the market equity premium for Danske Bank equity 
over assets with Log-modification and using OLS-specification: 
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑅 + 1,391256033 × 𝑅𝑝 
𝑅𝑝 = 9,63 
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Now we can calculate the new 𝑅𝐸 with the halved leverage 8,9285. After finding 
the new 𝑅𝐸 = 11,03841316, we use it in the PFC-equation 
  𝑃𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅𝐸(𝑒)𝑒 + 𝑅𝐷𝑔(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒]. 
 𝑃𝐹𝐶 = 11,03841316 × 0,112 + 2,456 × (1 − 0,112) 
 𝑃𝐹𝐶 = 3,42 
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